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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
John T. Wright*
INTRODUCTION
During the past thirty years, the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms has been the focus of a number of
instruments promulgated by the community of nations. The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,1 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,2 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights3 form the basis of efforts
by the United Nations to secure the observance of human rights
among member States. In addition to these universal documents,
the countries of Europe have drawn upon their common heritage
to promote the realization of human rights through the ratifica-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.' The Convention creates a Commission of
Human Rights, as well as a European Court of Human Rights.
This article will explore the workings of the Commission, the
more active of the two bodies, and will analyze its effectiveness
in establishing a standard for the observance of human rights in
light of the differing political systems of the European States.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
A. History
The European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms is a post-World War II creation of the Council
of Europe. Although the quest for European unity intensified in
the aftermath of the two world wars, it was not unique to the
twentieth century. Statesmen and philosophers of earlier eras had
pleaded the cause of unification, including Jean Jacques Rous-
* Doctoral candidate, New School for Social Research; B.A., Whitman College, 1969;
M.A., Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1973. The author served as
Research Officer for the International League for Human Rights.
1. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
2. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
3. Id. at 49.
4. Signed Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as Con-
vention], reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
COLLECTED TEXTS 101 (11th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED TExTs]. See Appen-
dix for the text of the Convention and the five Protocols.
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seau, William Penn, and Immanuel Kant, who saw in the ideal
of European unity the diminution of the use of force, the exalta-
tion of individual rights, and the ascension of a new plateau in
social development.
5
Immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II, there
was great interest in the notion of a united Europe, but a cool
reception from Great Britain, indifference from non-European
sources, and the emergence of Hitler's and Mussolini's nationalist
movements temporarily laid to rest all concepts of peaceful unifi-
cation and human rights. However, as the war drew to a close,
the sentiment for unification emerged once again under the lead-
ership of Winston Churchill, and the International Committee of
Movements for European Unity was formed.' This Committee,
composed of non-governmental organizations, issued a call for a
Congress of Europe to be held at The Hague in 1948.7 The Con-
gress adopted a series of articles and resolutions calling for a
united Europe, a Charter of Human Rights, a European Court of
Human Rights, and a European Assembly.'
The British at first were wary of the proposal for a European
Assembly, which was an obvious vehicle for the political integra-
tion of Europe. Ultimately, though, in deference to the depth of
European feeling, the British agreed to the creation of the Assem-
bly? In return, the Council of Ministers, a body for governmental
representation and cooperation with substantial control over the
Assembly, was created. 10 Thus, after much compromise, the Stat-
ute of the Council of Europe was signed on May 5, 1949, and
5. I. KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 23 (1972).
6. EUROPE UNITES 4 (1949).
7. The governments of Europe had not been idle. In the Brussels Pact of March 17,
1948, Britain, France and the Benelux States had joined in a military alliance. The
Convention for European Economic Cooperation was signed April 16, 1948, and, in re-
sponse to the invitation extended by the Marshall Plan, the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation was created. It should be noted that the breakdown of Four-Power
cooperation at the London meeting of November 1947 added impetus to the willingness
to cooperate as well as turned more sympathetic ears to pleas for European union. Id. at
5.
8. EUROPE UNITES, supra note 6, at 94-95; EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE 47-48 (1950).
9. A. ZURCHER, THE STRUGGLE TO UNITE EUROPE 30 (1958). The proposed European
Assembly became, in fact, the Consultative Assembly. Id.
10. For a fuller discussion of the negotiations and analysis of the positions of the
parties see EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 8, at 51-63. See
also A.H. ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 3-6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE COUN-
CIL OF EUROPE]; A.H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 12-17 (1973); A. ZURCHER, supra
note 9, at 28-39.
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entered into force on August 3, 1949.11
The Preamble to the Statute embodies the beliefs that bonds
exist linking the cultural and political heritage of the European
States and that both self-interest and moral considerations lead
the States to maintain and strengthen these bonds. Article 1 of
the Statute further states that "maintenance and further realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms" is a means
whereby the unity of Europe is to be strengthened, the ideals of
the common heritage realized, and economic and social progress
facilitated. Article 3 goes even further and requires respect for
and maintenance of human rights as a condition of membership.1 2
In setting the above criteria of membership, the Council of Eu-
rope, created to further the cause of European unity, established
a minimum standard for the international protection of human
rights, and, of equal importance, a minimum standard of State
behavior in the treatment of its nationals.' 3
There were two primary reasons for the importance attached
to human rights. One was the conviction that, with the memories
of Nazi tyranny still fresh, democracy is secure from the threat
of fascism only as long as human rights are respected and pro-
tected. 4 In order for a representative democracy to function, to
provide for orderly change, and to accommodate evolving needs
and demands, the exercise of such fundamental human rights as
life, liberty, and security must be unfettered.
Another factor adding impetus to the quest for the protection
of human rights was the ideological conflict with Soviet com-
munism. Human rights in the context of European unity were not
merely viewed as desirable in themselves or as a barrier to the
11. A. H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 321.
12. For an exhaustive study of the Council see THE COUNCm OF EUROPE, supra note
10.
13. Human rights are mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, art. 1, para.
3, but the maintenance of human rights has not been made an effective condition of
membership. Nor has the Charter placed legal obligations upon member States to respect
human rights. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 39-41 (1966). Lauterpacht, on
the other hand, maintains that a moral obligaton, which he construes as a legal one, has
been created. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145-65 (1968). It is
readily apparent that there is little, if any, recognition of this supposed obligation on the
part of the member States of the United Nations.
14. A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EUROPE]. For one of the few general discussions of the relationship between
democracy and human rights see DV. SANDIFER & L.R. ScHEmAN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
FREEDOM (1966), where the rights of association are viewed as pivotal to the ability of the
individual to participate in the political process.
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resurgence of Nazism on the continent, but also as a countervail-
ing force to the threat personified by Stalin. The fear of commu-
nism became ever greater, and the perceived threat intensified
as the year between the Hague Congress and the signature of the
Statute of the Council of Europe witnessed the imposition of the
Berlin blockade, the Greek Civil War, and the communist coup
in Czechoslovakia. Thus the desire for unity, the experience of
fascism, and the specter of Soviet totalitarianism led the Euro-
pean States to reaffirm "their devotion to the spiritual and moral
values which are the common heritage of their peoples
[and] which form the basis of all genuine democracy."' 5
On August 19, 1949, the Consultative Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe began consideration of proposals for a European
Convention on Human Rights. 6 Ten rights were recommended as
the subjects for protection: security of the person; freedom from
slavery and servitude; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention,
or exile, and the right to a fair trial; freedom from arbitrary inter-
ference in private and family life, home, and correspondence;
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of opinion
and expression; freedom of assembly; freedom of association;
freedom to unite in trade unions; and the right to marry and
found a family.' 7 These rights were to be the subject of a collective
guarantee implemented through the machinery of a European
Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of Justice.
The British wished to set sharp limits on the extent of their
commitment to the European human rights system.'" They felt
that precise definition of their commitment was necessary to re-
move all ambiguity as to the rights, duties, and obligations of all
parties concerned.' 9 The continental members, on the other
hand, maintained that the rights and freedoms to be guaranteed
did not require exhaustive and precise definition. It was felt that
since the rights were those "defined and accepted after long usage
15. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Preamble, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE COUN-
CIL OF EUROPE 299 (1970).
16. EUR. CONSULT. Ass'Y, REPORTS, 1ST SESS., at 210 (Aug. 19, 1949).
17. Id. at 212.
18. The British exhibited a consistent, though soft-spoken, position on European
unity. They desired unity, but not unification or integration. They also opposed any
alteration of traditional sovereign relations. Rather than identifying themselves as Euro-
pean participants of the movement toward unity, they considered themselves sympathetic
supporters. A. ZURcHER, supra note 9, at 42.
19. Well, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 804, 806 (1963).
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by the democratic regime," mere enumeration was more than
adequate.20 Furthermore, any questions that might arise could be
settled by the Court.2' Additional concern was expressed that
under a precise definition an accidental omission would be con-
strued as deliberate, thus foreclosing the development and exten-
sion of new rights.22
In August 1950, the Committee of Ministers adopted a com-
promise version of the Convention.2 The revised text reflected the
traditional international prerogatives of the sovereign State
rather than the supranational approach of the European Move-
ment. Acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court of Human
Rights was made optional,24 rather than compulsory, as was the
acceptance of the right of individuals to petition against a State.2
Furthermore, there were provisions for the filing of reservations
to the Convention 2 and for the suspension of the application of
the Convention by States in times of national emergency. 27
On November 4, 1950, the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter referred to as
Convention] was signed in Rome. 28 After additional work on
three controversial rights,2 agreement was reached on the First
Protocol, which was signed on March 20, 1952.10 The Convention
entered into force on September 3, 1953, and the Protocol on May
18, 1954.31
B. Structure
The Convention contains eleven rights32 guaranteed to
"everyone within the jurisdiction" of the contracting parties. The
Protocol protects an additional three rights.3 3 Enjoyment of these
20. EUR. CONSULT. Ass'Y, DOCuMENTS, 1ST SESS., at 197, Doc. No. 77 (Sept. 5, 1949).
21. G. WEL, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIG TS 28 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as WEiL].
22. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 10, at 164.
23. EuR. CONSULT. Ass'Y, DocUMHrs, 2D SEss., at 600, Doc. No. 11 (Aug. 8, 1950).
24. Convention, art. 25.
25. Id. art. 46.
26. Id. art. 64.
27. Id. art. 15.
28: COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 4, at 115.
29. They are the right to hold property, the right of parents to choose the education
of their children, and a right concerning political liberties. EuR. CONSULT. Ass'Y, DocU-
MEnS, 2D SESS., at 980, Doc. No. 93 (Aug. 24, 1950).
30. Europ. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
31. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 4, at 601.
32. Convention, arts. 2-12.
33. First Protocol, arts. 1-3.
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rights is guaranteed under strictly-defined standards of State
behavior. Individuals protected under the Convention must
"have an effective remedy before a national authority" in the
respective States. 4 Discrimination according to sex, race, or color
is forbidden.35 States retain the right to suspend application of
the Convention under certain conditions36 and to restrict the
political activity of aliens. 37 An "anti-fascist" clause prohibits
utilization of the rights protected by the Convention to violate the
rights of others. States may restrict the rights guaranteed only
for the purposes stated in the Convention. 39
Two organs were established by the Convention: the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights [hereinafter referred to as
Commission] and the European Court of Human Rights
[hereinafter referred to as Court]. 0 The Commission" may ad-
dress itself to any alleged violation of human rights brought to its
attention by any contracting State" or by individuals, groups, or
non-governmental organizations, provided the State in question
has filed a statement declaring the Commission competent to
receive such petitions.13 Admissibility of such petitions is subject
to certain restrictions. Anonymous petitions are inadmissible;44
all domestic remedies must have been exhausted; and a time
limit exists in which the petition must be submitted. 5
If a petition is deemed admissible, the Commission under-
takes to ascertain the facts alleged and to promote conciliation."
Upon effecting a friendly settlement, a report, stating the facts
and solution arrived at, is published. If the attempted
conciliation is unsuccessful, a report giving the facts of the case,
the opinion of the Commission as to the existence of a violation
of the Convention, and the recommendation of the Commission,
34. Convention, art. 13.
35. Id. art. 14.
36. Id. art. 15.
37. Id. art. 16.
38. Id. art. 17.
39. Id. art. 18.
40. Id. art. 19.
41. Articles 20 through 23 of the Convention enumerate the composition, manner of
selection, term, and legal character of the Commission and its members.
42. Convention, art. 24.
43. Id. art. 25.
44. Id. art. 27.
45. Id. art. 26.
46. Id. art. 28.
47. Id. art. 30.
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is referred to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope.48 This report is confidential.
If the case is not referred to the Court by the Ministers within
three months, then the Ministers must determine, by a two-
thirds majority vote, whether a violation of the Convention has
occurred. If it is determined that a violation of the Convention
has occurred, the Ministers may prescribe appropriate measures
to be taken by the State concerned.49
A case may be brought before the Court, subject to a declara-
tion of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by the State or
States concerned, by a contracting State, or by the Commission.-,
Individuals may not come before the Court.5' The Court may
"afford just satisfaction to an injured party" if a State is found
to have violated its obligations and the domestic law of the State
allows only partial remuneration.52 A reasoned judgment is ren-
dered.5 3 The judgment is final, 4 and the contracting States agree
to abide by the decision,55 supervised in execution by the Minis-
ters. 6
II. PROCEDURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The Commission is established by Article 19(1) of the Con-
vention "to ensure observance of the engagements undertaken by
the High Contracting Parties." Thus, unlike most bodies created
by treaty, the purpose of the Commission is not necessarily to act
in the best interests of the States involved but, insofar as possi-
ble, to ensure that the obligations devolving upon States as a
result of the Convention are upheld. The jurisprudence of the
Commission has established that "[t]he purpose . .. in con-
cluding the Convention was not to concede a reciprocal right...
but to realize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe."5
A frequent misapprehension concerning the Commission is
48. Id. art. 31.
49. Id. art. 32.
50. Id. art. 48. Articles 38 through 47 of the Convention deal with the composition,
term, remuneration, and jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
51. Id. art. 44.
52. Id. art. 50.
53. Id. art. 51.
54. Id. art. 52.
55. Id. art. 53.
56. Id. art. 54.
57. Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 116,
138 (Eur. Comm'n of Human Rights) (Pfunders Case) [hereinafter cited as Y.B.].
1977]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
that its functions are those of a supreme court occupying a posi-
tion over the domestic courts of the contracting parties similar to
that of the United States Supreme Court in relation to American
domestic courts. This notion has appeared frequently in applica-
tions before the Commission, although the Commission has been
steadfast in maintaining that it "was not set up as a higher court
to examine alleged errors of law or fact committed by the domes-
tic courts of the Contracting Parties . . .but to ensure obser-
vance of the law of [the Convention]."" It should not be infer-
red, however, that the Commission will not concern itself with
domestic law. The Commission has repeatedly taken the position
that if a domestic law or legal practice appears to violate the
Convention, the Commission may rule on the application and
interpret the law in question.59
Just as the Commission does not view itself as the agent of
the contracting parties, it refuses to see itself as an advocate for
an aggrieved individual. Rather, it considers itself an agent for
the Convention. Instances have arisen where both parties to a
case, for reasons of their own and without coercion, have re-
quested that the case be withdrawn. In each instance, before
permitting withdrawal, the Commission examined the case to
determine whether, "in the interests of safeguarding the rights
guaranteed in the Convention," the case should be pursued by
the Commission."
A. Composition of the Commission
Article 20 of the Convention provides that the number of
members of the Commission be equal to the number of contract-
ing parties. Thus there are eighteen members of the Commission,
each representing one of the States party to the Convention.'
58. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 254/57, [1955-57] EUR. COM'N OF
HUMAN RirHTS 150, 152 [hereinafter cited as EuR. COMM'N].
59. X v. Belgium, App. No. 458/59, [1960] Y.B. 222, 232. This point is made repeat-
edly. See, e.g., X v. Austria, App. No. 5560/72, [1973] Y.B. 172, 190; X v. Federal
Republic of Germany, App. No. 3911/69, [1969] Y.B. 324, 328; X v. Belgium, App. No.
1103/61, [19621 Y.B. 168, 190.
60. See, e.g., Alois Vampel v. Austria, App. No. 4465/70, [1971] Y.B. 476; Rebitzer
v. Austria, App. No. 3245/67, [1971] Y.B. 160; Wiener Stfidtische Wechselseitige Veris-
cherungsanstalt v. Austria, App. No. 2076/63, [1967] Y.B. 136; Niekisch v. Federal Re-
public of Germany, App. No. 1470/62, [1966] Y.B. 102; Gericke v. Federal Republic of
Germany, App. No. 2294/64, [1965] Y.B. 314.
61. The current members of the Commission are: F. Ermacora, Austria; J. Custers,
Belgium; M. Triantafyllides, Cyprus; C.A. Norgaard, Denmark; R.J. Dupuy, France; J.A.
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While no two members of the Commission may be nationals of
the same State, there is no requirement that the members of the
Commission be nationals of a High Contacting Party." Therefore,
there exists the possibility of a national of a State not party to
the Convention becoming a member of the Commission. How-
ever, given the history and practice of the Commission, it is
highly unlikely that this will occur.
No mention is made in the Convention of the qualifications
of the members of the Commission. It might be argued that the
lack of an enumerated minimal level of qualifications63 affords an
opportunity for mischief or at least for the selection of members
unfit for such a responsible position. Nevertheless, the members,
without exception, have been attorneys, former judges, legal ad-
visors, or professors of law."4 This, no doubt, results from the fact
that service on the Commission does not require full-time atten-
dance, thus enabling many competent individuals to serve.65
Article 21 distills the power of selecting members of the Com-
mission into two processes, performed by two distinct bodies. The
supranational body, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe, through its Bureau,6 formulates an initial list drawn
from submissions by the national groups. This list serves as the
pool from which the Committee of Ministers, the organ of na-
tional representation in the Council of Europe, makes its
selection. In addition, the Bureau of the Consultative Assembly
has taken it upon itself to make recommendations to the Com-
Frousein, Federal Republic of Germany; G. Tenekines, Greece; G. Jorundsson, Iceland;
B. Kiernan, Ireland; G. Sperduti, Italy; N. Klecker, Luxembourg; E. Busuttil, Malta;
C.H.F. Polak, Netherlands; T. Opsahl, Norway; L. Kellberg, Sweden; S. Treschel, Switz-
erland; B. Daver, Turkey; J.E.S. Fawcett, United Kingdom. [1975] Y.B. 34.
62. See text accompanying notes 68-78 infra. The members of the Commission serve
in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of their States.
63. Article 39(3) of the Convention gives a rather vague description of the qualities
that a judge of the European Court of Human Rights should possess. No mention is made
in the Convention of the qualities a member of the Commission should possess.
64. Biographies of Commission members are published in the Yearbook in the year
of their election.
65. The Commission has adopted the practice of holding fixed sessions, totaling
approximately two months spread over a one-year span. J.E.S. FAwcErr, THE APPLICATION
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTs 323-24 (1969).
66. The Bureau of the Consultative Assembly is composed of the President and the
seven Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. It is responsible for arranging the agenda as well
as the timetable of debates. It always includes members from each of the four big powers
and one from each of the regional groupings: Scandinavia, Benelux, Balkans, and either
Ireland or Austria. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 10, at 52.
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mittee of Ministers, 7 but because these are secret, it is impossible
to determine whether they have been effective. What is readily
ascertainable is the fact that the nationality of the Commission-
ers has always corresponded to the nationality of the High Con-
tracting Parties.
Article 23 emphasizes the independence and non-
representative character of the Commission. Rule 2 of the Rules
and Procedures of the Commission, established pursuant to Arti-
cle 36, provides that each member of the Commission take an
oath prior to the assumption of duties and pledge, among other
things, honorable and faithful discharge of his duties, impartial-
ity, and conscientiousness."8 Commissioners, who are elected for
a period of six years,69 are compensated by the Council of Eu-
rope.7 0
In accordance with Rule 5, the Commission elects from its
members a President and a Vice-President." An order of prece-
dence, established according to the total period of service and
age, determines the hierarchy of the Commission after the Presi-
dent and Vice President." The President must relinquish his
office 3 if he is a national of a State party to a case, or if he had
been appointed to serve on a subcommission pursuant to Article
29 prior to amendment. 4 If upon accession to the Presidency by
the Vice-President the same situation occurs, the identical pro-
cedure according to order of precedence must be followed. In the
First and Second Cyprus Cases,75 brought by Greece against the
United Kingdom, both the President and Vice-President, of
British and Greek citizenship, respectively, ceded their seats.
67. EUR. CONSULT. Ass'y, OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES, 6TH SESS., at 709 (Sept. 22,
1954).
68. Rule 2, Rules of Procedure of the Eur. Comm'n of Human Rights, reprinted in
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGTrS, COLLECTED TEXTS 301 (11th
ed. 1976).
69. Convention, art. 22.
70. HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 14, at 46.
71. Election is by absolute majority, or, if necessary, by simple majority on the
second ballot. Rule 5(3), supra note 68.
72. Rule 3, id.
73. Rule 9, id.
74. Prior to amendment by Protocol Three to the Convention, Article 29 provided for
the establishment of subcommissions, consisting of seven members of the Commission,
of which one was appointed by each party concerned. The purpose of the subcommission
was to review the application and make a report to the full Commission.
75. Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 174; Greece v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 299/57, [1958-59] Y.B. 178.
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Members are disqualified from service if they have pre-
viously participated in the case on behalf of either side or if they
had any prior occasion to render an opinion." A member may
withdraw from consideration of a particular case or the President
may request that a member withdraw; in the event of a dispute
over withdrawal the Commission renders a decision.7
It appears that ample safeguards have been instituted to
ensure the impartiality of the Commission and to guard against
the influence of members' national ties on the Commission. The
question is whether the formal apparatus outlined above has the
intended practical effect. This is impossible to answer since the
Commission meets in camera.78 However, there is an appearance
of propriety which is a positive step in engendering public confi-
dence in the Commission.
B. Prerequisites to Admissibility of Applications
1. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The requirement that all domestic remedies be exhausted, as
provided by Article 26 of the Convention, is derived from tradi-
tional practice in international law.
It is a recognized rule that an international tribunal will not
entertain a claim put forward ... on account of a denial of
justice unless the person in question has exhausted the legal
remedies available to him in the State concerned. So long as
there has been no final pronouncement on the part of the highest
competent authority within the State it cannot be said that
justice has definitely been denied."
The question whether in a given application all domestic
remedies have been exhausted has been the subject of much juris-
prudence. The early practice of the Commission was that a case
could not be filed prior to the domestic decision upon final ap-
peal .8 This position, however, has been abandoned. The Com-
mission now allows an application to be filed before final domes-
tic judgment, as long as the highest final decision of the domestic
courts is reached prior to the Commission's decision as to admis-
76. Rule 21, supra note 68.
77. Id.
78. Convention, art. 33.
79. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 361 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
80. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 276/57, [1955-571 EuR. COMM'N 171.
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sibility.8' This more lenient view is also shared by the European
Court.12
All judgments filed before the Commission must have been
final,1 and all relevant and mandatory statutory time limits must
have been observed.84 If avenues exist for the appeal of adminis-
trative decisions, they must have been utilized and exhausted."
Moreover, all points claimed in an application must have been
pleaded at the appropriate time during the appeals process."
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Commission requires that docu-
ments be submitted showing that domestic remedies have indeed
been exhausted, and provides that the burden of proof rests upon
the applicant.87 However, the Commission has also held that a
State respondent, if claiming that an applicaton is inadmissible
due to failure to exhaust, must establish the existence of unex-
hausted and "effective" remedies.8 An application rejected under
the domestic remedies rule may, upon subsequent exhaustion, be
resubmitted, with evidence of exhaustion considered as "new
information." Since the Commission will view the application as
"new," it will not be disqualified under Article 27(2), i.e., as
"being substantially the same as matters which have already
been considered by the Commission. '8
The phrase "according to the generally recognized rules of
International Law" was inserted in Article 26 to provide for the
bypassing of the domestic remedies rule if resort to domestic
remedies would result in undue delay. The Commission has held
that only remedies it considers effective need be exhausted. A
remedy is considered ineffective if a clear legal precedent exists
81. Ringeisen v. Austria, App. No. 2614/65, [1968] Y.B. 268, 304-06.
82. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SER.
A, at 38 (1971) (Ringeisen Case, Judgment of July 16, 1971).
83. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 225/56, [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 145.
84. X v. Sweden, App. No. 3788/68, [1970] Y.B. 548; X v. Federal Republic of
Germany, App. No. 352/58, [1958-59] Y.B. 342.
85. X v. Denmark, App. No. 238/56, [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 206.
86. Delcourt v. Belgium, App. No. 2689/65, [1967] Y.B. 238; X v. Norway, App. No.
2002/63, [19641 Y.B. 262, 266-68; X v. Belgium, App. No. 458/59, [1960] Y.B. 232; X v.
Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 263/57, [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 146.
87. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 232/56, [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 143.
88. Kaiser v. Austria, App. No. 4459/70, [1971] Y.B. 446, 468; Greece v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 299/57, [1958-59] Y.B. 186, 190-92.
89. X v. Sweden, App. No. 434/58, [1958-59] Y.B. 354, 376.
90. Doc. CM/WPI(50)15, at 27, cited in WEIL, supra note 21, at 105. See J. RALSTON,
THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 815 (1926); Brochard, The Local
Remedies Rule, 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 729, 731-32 (1934).
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militating against the desired conclusions of the applicant,9' or if
further proceedings would be repetitious.2
In addition to the international law exception to the exhaus-
tion requirement, the Commission has developed other excep-
tions by construing domestic statutes as failing to provide legally
enforceable rights. In one case, an individual was denied the right
to work as a journalist because he was a convicted Nazi collabora-
tor. The Commission, in ruling on admissibility, held that while
the applicant could sue for reinstatement of his rights under a
domestic statute, such a suit did not constitute an effective do-
mestic remedy because its purpose would be to "obtain a favor
and not to vindicate a right. '9 3 Similarly, in the case of Lawless
v. Ireland,94 the applicant had refused to sign an oath promising
not to engage in certain political activities. The Irish government
maintained that failure to do so was a failure to exhaust domestic
remedies. The Commission held that to secure a right as funda-
mental as freedom by signing such a pledge was not a procedure
under law and, therefore, not a domestic remedy. 5
Domestic remedies under Article 26 may be either judicial or
administrative, but they do not comprehend pardons" or acts of
clemency. 7 In its ruling on the admissibility of the first Greek
application against Great Britain concerning Cyprus, the Com-
mission interpreted the domestic remedies rule to exclude the
allegedly violative legislative measures and administrative prac-
tices. In 1970, the Commission stated that the domestic reme-
dies rule does not apply in cases which raise the question of the
compatibility of legislative measures and administrative prac-
tices with the provisions of the Convention.9 Similarly, decisions
of the Swedish Ombudsman are not considered by the Commis-
sion as a "normal, effective and sufficient local remedy within the
meaning of generally recognized International Law."'9'
91. A and Associates v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 899/60, [19621 Y.B.
136, 144.
92. X v. Austria, App. No. 514/59, [1960] Y.B. 196, 202.
93. De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 214, 238.
94. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, [1958-59] Y.B. 308 (Lawless Case).
95. Id. at 326.
96. Koch v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 1270/61, [19621 Y.B. 126, 134.
97. X v. Belgium, App. No. 458/59, [1960] Y.B. 222, 234.
98. Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, [1958-59] Y.B. at 182-86.
99. Denmark v. Greece, App. No. 4448/70, [19701 Y.B. 108, 132 (Second Greek
Case).
100. X v. Sweden, App. No. 3893/68, [1970] Y.B. 620, 624.
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The Commission has also demonstrated a salutary willing-
ness to look beyond mere appearance and delve into the sub-
stance of "effective" remedies. In the Greek Case the Commission
noted that, due to various laws and the suspension of constitu-
tional provisions, the independence of the judiciary had been so
interfered with that no possibility of effective remedy existed.'0 '
Such close and realistic examination is a positive indication of
the diligence and sincerity of the Commission. And it is again a
reminder that the traditional prerogatives of a State have become
somewhat attenuated in the Convention system.
In ruling upon the admissibility of the application in Ireland
v. United Kingdom,'02 the Commission differentiated between
allegations of death caused by security forces and torture during
interrogation. The Commission ruled that the Irish government
had not demonstrated the existence of an administrative practice
which caused the deaths of twenty-two individuals, and,
therefore, held the portion of the application dealing with secu-
rity forces inadmissible because domestic remedies had not been
exhausted.10 3 The Commission, however, in treating the portion
of the application concerning torture, held that certain interroga-
tion techniques would be considered administrative practices,
and that therefore the domestic remedies rule did not apply. 10
The question of the exhaustion of remedies, which is nor-
mally a preliminary phase, has occasionally been deferred for
consideration along with the merits of the case. This procedure
is known as "joining to the merits" and is resorted to when the
merits of the case and the question of exhaustion are sufficiently
involved to require consideration of both to arrive at a conclu-
sion. 10 5 Although a time-consuming process, it allows a case to be
considered on the merits as well as on admissibility rather than
relegating the questions involved to a summary procedure.
The final phrase of Article 26 imposes a time limit upon the
applicant. Applications must be submitted within six months of
the date of the final domestic decision. The Commission has held
that the date of final decision shall be considered as that date on
101. Denmark v. Greece, App. Nos. 3321-23/67, 3344/67, [1968] Y.B. 690, 774 (Greek
Case).
102. App. No. 5310/71, [1972] Y.B. 76.
103. Id. at 242.
104. Id. at 246.
105. Alam v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2991/66, [1967] Y.B. 478, 504; Austria v.
Italy, App. No. 788/60, [1963] Y.B. 742, 766-68 (Pfunders Case).
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which the applicant had "reasonably effective notice" of it., '
Since the Commission must determine the date of the final deci-
sion, it also must decide in each case what constitutes the "final"
decision.
In the De Becker Case,"7 the decision of the trial court was
reached on June 14, 1947. As the Convention did not become
effective until June 14, 1955, the application appeared obviously
invalid both ratione temporis and under the six-month limit. De
Becker, however, was not complaining of his trial but of its after-
effect upon him. The Commission found that the violation of De
Becker's rights was continuous and could not be vindicated by
domestic remedies. Thus there could not be a date of final deci-
sion and the six-month rule did not apply.11
The Commission has held that petitions for pardon" 9 or re-
quests for a new trial"I0 cannot be viewed as extending the dates
of final decision in the calculation of the six-month period. As
noted above, pardons are not considered effective remedies.
Therefore, the date of final decision is the date of the final deter-
mination of the main case."'
In applying the six-month rule, the Commission is able to
exercise a certain degree of discretion. It is lenient in determining
the date of the final domestic decision and the date of receipt of
the application."12 Moreover, the Commission will take into con-
sideration the realistic possibility of the applicant's ability to
comply with the six-month rule."' Thus the Commission has al-
lowed itself to operate in a very flexible manner to prevent proce-
dural rules from operating against the thrust of the Convention.
2. Further Requirements
Sections one and two of Article 27 place further limitations
upon the competence of the Commission in dealing with applica-
tions. Two reasons lie behind the inclusion of this article in the
Convention. Legal experts wished to ease the burden on the Com-
mission by allowing decisions to be made quickly on applications
106. App. No. 864/60, cited in J. FAwcErr, supra note 65, at 305.
107. De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 214.
108. Id.
109. X v. Belgium, App. No. 458/59, [1960] Y.B. 234.
110. De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 214.
ill. F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS 51 (1974):
112. Kaiser v. Austria, App. No. 4459/70, [1971] Y.B. 446, 448.
113. WELL, supra note 21, at 122.
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obviously inadmissible,' and to ensure that interstate applica-
tions would not be rejected prior to a hearing before the Commis-
sion." 5
The provision excluding anonymous applications is straight-
forward. The Commission, however, has determined that if an
application contains any element which results in identification
of the applicant, it is sufficient to avoid disqualification." 6 This
procedure enables the Commission to deal with applications pre-
pared by individuals lacking in education, knowledge of proce-
dures, or natural gifts. A small service, perhaps, but a meaningful
one.
In the case of applications previously rejected, additional
information will be considered as "new information" by the Com-
mission under Article 27 only if the information modifies the
grounds of the previous rejection.' 7 Exhaustion of domestic reme-
dies, subsequent to rejection for non-exhaustion, is considered
"new information" and allows the application to be eligible for
reconsideration. 118
The prohibition against the admissibility of a matter already
submitted to another international tribunal is not absolute. The
application will be declared admissible in the event the other
body is unable to render a decision, indicating "due respect for
the protection of human rights of the party involved.""'
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 27, matters
"incompatible with the provisions of the .. .Convention" are
also considered inadmissible. This is a vague phrase and is ap-
plied in three main classes of cases. The first class is that in which
the Commission does not have jurisdiction over one of the parties
(ratione personae). The second class concerns applications which
allege violation of rights not protected in the Convention (ratione
materiae) .120
The third class of cases concerns applications alleging viola-
tions of provisions covered by reservations made under Article
114. Doc. CM/WPI(50)15, at 26-27, cited in WEIL, supra note 21, at 123.
115. Id. at 28.
116. App. No. 361/58, cited in WEIL, supra note 21, at 123.
117. X v. Sweden, App. No. 434/58, [1958-59] Y.B. 354, 374.
118. X v. Belgium, App. No. 347/58, [1958-59] Y.B. 407, 484-86. See text accompa-
nying note 89 supra.
119. WEIL, supra note 21, at 125.
120. See [1971] Y.B. 734 for a listing of rights not guaranteed under the Convention.
See also [19701 Y.B. 1042-44.
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64. 21 In this situation, since the reservation exempts the provision
from the coverage of the Convention, an application alleging a
violation of that provision is deemed incompatible with the Con-
vention. Jurisprudence in this area deals mainly with Austrian
reservations to Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention.'22 Two applica-
tions filed with the Commission, Ofner v. Austria'23 and
Hopfinger v. Austria,14 alleged violations by Austria of Article 5,
which guarantees the right to public proceedings. Since Article 5
was covered by an Austrian reservation, the Commission was
faced with the task of determining whether the reservation was
specific and valid or whether it was a general reservation prohib-
ited by Article 64(1). Although the Commission found that the
reservation linked a number of laws together, it nevertheless de-
termined that the reservation made specific reference to Article
90 of the 1920 Austrian Constitution. 25 Therefore, since the reser-
vation was specific, the right guaranteed under Article 5 of the
Convention was excluded from the coverage of the Convention,
and the applications were deemed inadmissible.
A student of the jurisprudence of the Commission, however,
maintained that according to a strict reading of Article 64, Aus-
tria's reservation should have been disqualified because Article 90
provided generally for "exceptions . . .by law." Professor Mor-
risson viewed the flexible interpretation of Austria's reserva-
tions under Article 64 as contrary to the purpose of the Conven-
tion. "In a Convention which is designed to safeguard human
rights, any reservation from its principles should be interpreted
most restrictively. Allowing any question of what the State in-
tended to reserve but did not is very dangerous precedent.' 26
Applications have also been declared inadmissible as having
been submitted by a party engaged in activities prohibited by
Article 17, the "anti-fascist" clause. ' 127 The Commission has
held 128 that the avowed aim of the West German Communist
121. Convention, art. 64.
122. See [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 40-45 and [1958-59] Y.B. 85-91 for texts of the
reservations.
123. Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, [1960] Y.B. 322.
124. Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 617/59, [1960] Y.B. 370, 378.
125. C. MORRISSON, THE DEVELOPING EUROPEAN LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 136 (1965)
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado).
126. Id. at 140.
127. Communist Party of Germany v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 250/57,
[1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 222.
128. F. CASTBERG, supra note 111, at 171.
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Party was to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat and that
such a dictatorship would result in the suppression of various
rights protected by the Convention. Therefore the Communist
Party violated the terms of Article 17, and its application was
considered "incompatible" with the provisions of the Conven-
tion. 129 This interpretation, which was undoubtedly correct in
1957, might be reconsidered in light of developments today. Any
criticism of the interpretation, however, must be withheld until
evidence is found indicating that the German Communists have
followed the French example of abandonment of the theory of
dictatorship of the proletariat.
The prohibition in Article 27 against applications
"manifestly ill-founded" is as vague as "incompatibility," but
differs in that it involves matters of substance rather than form.
The phrase has usually been interpreted as requiring a determi-
nation by the Commissioner of the existence of a prima facie
violation upon a preliminary examination.' 0 The intent of the
drafters in including this provision was to enable the Commission
to reject those applications that are so flagrantly and obviously
without merit that little time should be wasted in dealing with
them.'3 ' Thus a cursory procedure was envisioned.
In practice, the Commission has repeatedly taken the posi-
tion that an application cannot be declared manifestly ill-
founded if it is not "obviously ill-founded.' 32 This interpretation
is meant to ensure that a case which requires determination of its
merits is not summarily dismissed as a result of a preliminary
examination.'33 Unfortunately, in some cases, the Commission
has delved rather deeply into the merits of the case and then
declared the application inadmissible as ill-founded. Gudmunds-
son v. Iceland'34 is a case in point. The case, which dealt with
taxation, was exceedingly complex; seventeen pages were re-
quired for the Commission's findings on the facts. Yet this case
was declared manifestly ill-founded-an instance in which the
investigation necessary to arrive at a decision obviously exceeded
a cursory level.
129. Id.
130. De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 214, 252-54.
131. Doc. CM/WPI(50)15, at 26-27, cited in WEIL, supra note 21, at 123.
132. De Wilde v. Belgium, App. No. 2832/66, Ooms v. Belgium, App. No. 2835/66,
Versyp v. Belgium, App. No. 2899/66, [1967] Y.B. 420, 458 (Vagrancy Cases).
133. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 5207/71, [1971] Y.B. 698, 710;
Alam v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2991/66, [1967] Y.B. 478, 502-06.
134. App. No. 511/59, [1960] Y.B. 394.
[Vol. 111:2
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
This approach, apparently, has changed as the Commission
has become institutionalized. Initially, the Commission engaged
in considerable fact-finding but declared few applications admis-
sible. As the Commission acquired more self-assurance, it modi-
fied its practice and accepted more applications. It appears that,
in the early years, the Commission preferred to examine the mer-
its quite closely as it considered the admissibility of an applica-
tion, in order to both grant the applicant the benefit of Commis-
sion scrutiny and at the same time avoid admission of a large
number of cases. A large number of admissions in the initial
period might have unsettled member States at a time when State
acceptance of the Commission was not yet an empirical fact. The
wisdom or necessity of this approach today is highly questionable,
and it appears the Commission has abandoned it.
An application may also be declared inadmissible under Ar-
ticle 27 as an "abuse of the right of petition."'35 Again this is a
vague reference giving a degree of discretion to the Commission.
The Commission has held that "persistent negligence by the ap-
plicant in responding to Commission requests for information or
documents" is an abuse of the right of petition.' 36
Various other actions have been considered an abuse of the
right to petition. The submission of repetitious applications has
been considered an abuse. 13 7 In rather exasperated language the
Commission has denounced as an abuse "persistent, ill-founded
and querulous complaints" by the same party because they waste
the Commission's time.' 38 Applications containing scurrilous and
offensive expressions aimed at individuals and not supported by
facts' 39 will be rejected unless the applicant apologizes and
withdraws the objectionable statements.'40 It is also an abuse to
mislead the Commission.'
135. Convention, art. 27(2). An application submitted by Ilse Koch, notorious wife
of a Nazi concentration camp commandant, was rejected as being flagrantly unreasonable
and wholly unsupported by the Convention. Koch v. Federal Republic of Germany, App.
No. 1270/61, [19621 Y.B. 126, 136.
136. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 169/56, [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N
195, 197.
137. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 1307/61, [1965] Y.B. 230, 236.
138. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. Nos. 5070/71, 5071/71, 5186/71, [1972]
Y.B. 474, 482.
139. Rafael v. Austria, App. No. 2424/65, [1966] Y.B. 426, 434-36.
140. Huber v. Austria, App. No. 4517/70, [1971] Y.B. 447, 512.
141. App. No. 2625/65, 28 COLLECTED DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (May 1969).
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The Commission has declined to consider to be an abuse a
complaint motivated by political considerations or by public-
ity."' The government of Ireland in the Lawless Case' charged
that application was inadmissible since Lawless, alleged to be a
member of the Irish Republican Army, was politically motivated.
The Commission held that while this might be true, it was insuffi-
cient to constitute an abuse.' In Iversen v. Norway' the Com-
mission refused to accept Norway's contention that statements
by the applicant that the governmental system was "commu-
nistic" constituted an abuse.4
The Commission, by virtue of the relative vagueness of the
provisions of Article 27, has been forced to make its own way and
to develop doctrines and procedures in applying the Article. The
Commission has done this well, and in keeping with the spirit of
the Convention. Its practice with regard to the "manifestly ill-
founded" doctrine initially ran counter to the intent of the
drafters, but with experience, self-confidence, and an established
jurisprudence to depend upon, the Commission has slowed, if not
reversed, the early trend of declaring cases inadmissible after
what amounted to a consideration on the merits.
The Commission originally faced a strong challenge in those
cases in which political statements by the applicants were chal-
lenged as being "abusive" by the State respondents. In refusing
to agree, the Commission removed a grave potential obstacle to
the submission and effective consideration of individual applica-
tions. While political considerations undoubtedly exist in the
work of the Commission, there is as yet no evidence of any grave
miscarriage of justice or of any successful application of overt
pressure.
C. Procedure After a Finding of Admissibility
Article 28 entrusts the Commission with the performance of
two functions when an application is declared admissible. Para-
graph (a) requires that the Commission act in a manner similar
to a court of law in "ascertaining the facts of the matter." In
exercising this function, the Commission is empowered to request
142. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, [1958-59] Y.B. 308 (Lawless Case).
143. Id. at 338.
144. Id.
145. Iversen v. Norway, App. No. 1468/62, [1963] Y.B. 278.
146. Id. at 324-26.
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written pleadings "7 and to hold hearings4 8 in which sworn wit-
nesses may be questioned by both parties.' The parties may be
assisted by counsel. Individuals of limited means may apply to
the Council of Europe for assistance in meeting the expense of
counsel and witnesses. 50 Unlike a court, the decision as to
whether a violation of the Convention has occurred is not final;
the Commission takes no action except to refer the report to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and possibly to
the European Court of Human Rights as well as to the State
concerned.
1. Friendly Settlement
Paragraph (b) of Article 28 obliges the Commission to func-
tion in a manner reminiscent of a traditional conciliation com-
mission in order to arrive at a friendly settlement. 5' The Commis-
sion is free to arrive at any settlement which respects human
rights as defined in the Convention. This provision was inserted
to ensure that a settlement reached did not have the effect of
ratifying a violation of the Convention. The report on the friendly
settlement under Article 30 must contain the date on which it was
drawn, the names of the Commissioners, a description of the
parties, the names of the representatives of the parties, a state-
ment of facts, and the terms of the settlement. 52
Prior to an amendment effective November 21, 1970,111 Arti-
cle 29 provided for the establishment of a subcommission to per-
form the functions outlined in Article 28.11 Each subcommission
was composed of seven members of the Commission, and of those
seven, one was appointed by each party concerned. In all cases
State respondents appointed their nationals to serve on the
subcommissions. 55
This procedure invited much criticism because the require-
ment for the establishment of a subcommission for each applica-
147. Rule 39, supra note 68.
148. Rule 31, id.
149. Rule 34, id.
150. Rule 1, Addendum to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, supra note 68.
151. The notion of the Commission as conciliator appears in the proposal put forward
by the European Movement, Doc. DH(56)18, at 1-2, cited in WEIL, supra note 21, at 127.
152. Rule 50, supra note 68.
153. Third Protocol to the Convention, Mar. 6, 1959, Europ. T.S. 45, 544 U.N.T.S.
294, reprinted in COLLCTED TF-xTs, supra note 4, at 125-28.
154. See [1955-57] EuR. COMM'N 22 for Article 29 prior to amendment by the Third
Protocol. See Rule 9, supra note 68.
155. WEIL, supra note 21, at 132.
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tion was both time-consuming and clumsy."' The fact that the
plenary Commission would probably review the same points cov-
ered by the subcommission was criticized as redundant. The
Third Protocol to the Convention was proposed in order to speed
up the procedure and to facilitate consideration of cases by the
Commission. 157 The revised provision also enables the Commis-
sion, by unanimous vote, to reject an application already admit-
ted. The purpose of the provision is to establish a further screen-
ing process and to take into account information not available
during consideration as to admissibility. The requirement of
unanimity ensures that an application deemed admissible by so
slight a minority as one, will still receive a full hearing on the
merits. It also provides that the entire Commission is to perform
the function of attempting to reach a friendly settlement.
The Commission did not succeed in effecting a friendly set-
tlement until 1965.'' Since then nine such settlements have been
arrived at,'59 stilling criticism that the provision for friendly set-
tlement was a failure. 160
The first instance of friendly settlement under Article 30 was
reached in 1965 in Boeckmans v. Belgium."' This case alleged a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention during an appeal to a
domestic court. The judge of a Belgian appeals court charac-
terized the defendant's defense as "lying," "scandalous," "dis-
graceful," "improbable," and "distasteful."''6 The same judge
also increased the defendant's sentence by six months."' The
solution reached by the Commission acknowledged that the
original court's finding of guilt was valid but stated that
the remarks . . . by the President of the 14th Chamber of the
Court of Appeals ... were such as to disturb the serenity of the
atmosphere during the proceedings in a manner contrary to the
Convention and may have caused the Applicant a moral injury;
.... [T]he sum of 65,000 Belgian Francs would constitute
adequate reparation for this inquiry ....
156. J. FAwcE'r, supra note 65, at 317.
157. F. CASTBERG, supra note 111, at 184.
158. Boeckmans v. Belgium, App. No. 1727/62, [1965] Y.B. 410.
159. Poerschke v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2120/64, [1966 Y.B. 632.
160. Weil, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note
19, at 819.
161. App. No. 1727/62, [1965] Y.B. 410.
162. Boeckmans v. Belgium, App. No. 1727/62, [1963] Y.B. 370.
163. Boeckmans v. Belgium, App. No. 1727/62, [1965] Y.B. at 414-16.
164. Id. at 422.
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It is noteworthy that the Commission did not find the actions of
the judge to be contrary to a specific article of the Convention,
but "contrary to the Convention" as a whole.
The applicant in the second instance of friendly settlement"5
alleged excessive detention pending trial. The applicant with-
drew the application when he was granted conditional release on
probation.6 The only noteworthy aspect in this case is the fact
that although the applicant did not allege violation of Article
6(1), the Commission on its own invoked this section in consider-
ing the admissibility of the case.16
In a third case, Alam v. United Kingdom,'68 the question
concerned the refusal by the United Kingdom to allow Khan to
join his father Alam in Great Britain. The fact that Alam had
taken two wives and that Kahn was born of the second was the
reason for the refusal.'69 The solution reached involved the agree-
ment of the government of the United Kingdom to pay the air
fare for Khan from a village in Pakistan to London without any
acknowledgement that the United Kingdom had modified its
position as stated in the hearing.7 0 The representative of the
United Kingdom also informed the Commission that legislation
conferring rights of appeal upon aliens with regard to admission
to and removal from the United Kingdom would be introduced .17
This undertaking indicates that the Convention may have a posi-
tive effect in bringing about the conformity of domestic law with
the provisions of the Human Rights Convention.
It thus appears that the friendly settlement provision is use-
ful, and will continue to be a basis of the Commission's work. It
will obviously be more efficacious in righting wrongs than in es-
tablishing a jurisprudence on human rights.
2. Procedure if Friendly Settlement is Not Reached
In contrast to Article 30, Article 31 contemplates cases in
which friendly settlement has not been reached. The report of the
Commission under this article shall contain the date, the names
of the members of the Commission taking part, a description of
165. Poerschke v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2120/64, [1966] Y.B. 632.
166. Id. at 640.
167. Id. at 638.
168. App. No. 2991/66, [1968] Y.B. 788.
169. [19671 Y.B. 478-506.
170. [1968] Y.B. 790.
171. Id. at 794.
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the parties, the names of representatives and counsel for the par-
ties, a statement of the proceedings on the facts, a reasoned opin-
ion as to the existence of a breach of the Convention, the numbers
in the majority, and any proposals for compensation the Commis-
sion deems appropriate."' - Provision for minority opinions is made
both in Article 31 and in Rule 67. The report may be referred at
the Commission's option to either the Committee of Ministers or
to the European Court of Human Rights.' Although Article 30
provides for publication of the report of friendly settlement, Arti-
cle 31 does not since, under the situation envisioned in Article
31, a satisfactory settlement of the matter has not been reached
and further action is still to be taken. Since the process is not
complete, confidentiality must be upheld.
While State applicants as well as State repondents receive a
copy of the report under Article 31, individual applicants do not.
Nor are individual applicants notified that the case has been
referred to the Committee of Ministers. Thus, in this situation,
the individual is in a position of inequality vis-a-vis the State.
This inequality may be obviated if, under Articles 32 and 48, the
matter is referred to the European Court of Human Rights. In this
eventuality, Rule 61 (formerly Rule 76) requires the Commission
to notify the individual applicant and, unless the Commission
decides otherwise, the Secretary of the Commission is required to
transmit the report of the Commission to the individual appli-
cant.7 4 The applicant may, within a certain time, submit to the
Commission observations on the report.7
The provisions of Rule 61 came under strenuous attack be-
fore the Court in the Lawless Case."' Pursuant to the Rule, the
Commission transmitted its report to Lawless and requested his
observations. Ireland contended that in sending the report to
Lawless, the Commission had placed Ireland in a position of ine-
quality with respect to the applicant because the State was pro-
hibited from publishing the report17 while the comments of the
individual had been requested. Ireland further contended that
the omission of any reference in the Convention concerning the
transmission of the report to individuals was intentional since the
172. Rule 53, supra note 68.
173. Rule 55, id.
174. Rule 61, id.
175. Id.
176. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, [1960] Y.B. 474, 506-08 (Lawless Case).
177. Convention, art. 31.
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contracting parties had not wished to grant individuals locus
standi before the European Court of Human Rights."8
The Court held'79 that it was unable to determine the validity
of the Rule; since the decision of the Court would bind only the
parties to this case, any decision against the Rule's validity would
de facto be an advisory opinion contrary to the Convention.' The
Court further held that its primary purpose was to provide for the
proper administration of justice and hence it might, if necessary
to the just resolution of the issue, take into consideration the
views of the applicant as expressed in written observations.'
The validity of Rule 61, the willingness of the Commission
to request the observations of the individual applicant, and the
willingness of the Court to apprise itself of those observations,
together constitute a definite addition to the protection of human
rights in the European system. The individual does not, pursuant
to Article 48, have standing before the European Court of Human
Rights. Only the Commission and States party to the Convention
may bring a case before the Court. And were it not for Rule 61,
the individual applicant would remain ignorant, until a judgment
was rendered, as to the status of the application. Rule 61 not only
informs the individual of the status of his application but,
through written observations, provides an avenue whereby the
individual may make his views known to the Court. This is ad-
mittedly no substitute for granting the individual standing before
the Court, but since the Convention does not grant it, the estab-
lishment of some means for hearing the views of the applicant is
a positive step. The Commission, in providing for this step,
moved to fill a gap left in the Convention.
Up to this point, the Commission has performed quasi-
178. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, [19601 Y.B. at 500-02 (Lawless Case).
179. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
SER. A, at 4, 9-10 (1961) (Lawless Case, preliminary objections and questions of proce-
dure). The Greek judge, G. Maridakis, in his dissenting opinion, maintained that Rule
76 (Rule 61) was contrary to the Convention and that, although the Court could not
declare it void, it could refuse to give it effect. Maridakis considered the question of
whether the State had violated the Convention to be the crux of the case, rather than the
wrong done the applicant. Id. at 17-21.
180. The Second Protocol to the Convention gave the Court the power to render
advisory opinions. However, the Protocol prohibits the opinions from dealing "with any
question relating to the content or scope of the rights of freedoms defined in Section 1 of
the Convention and in the Protocols thereto . . . ." Second Protocol, art. 1(2), Dec. 15,
1956, Europ. T.S. 44, 261 U.N.T.S. 410, reprinted in COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 4, at
120-23.
181. See note 179 supra.
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judicial,182 conciliatory,1 3 or, under Rule 61, amicus curiae func-
tions. In transmitting the report to the Committee to Ministers
with findings and proposals, the Commission once again exercises
a quasi-judicial function. However, in determining, under Article
32, whether the matter is to be referred to the European Court of
Human Rights, the Commission makes a political decision. Is the
matter to be decided by a two-thirds majority of a body of govern-
mental representatives, '84 or by a simple majority of an indepen-
dent judiciary?'8 5 By opting for the Court, the Commission is able
to ensure a balanced treatment of the case according to judicial
procedure.' 8
If the Commission does not refer a case to the European
Court, then under Article 32, the Committee of Ministers must
decide whether a violation of the Convention has occurred. In
actuality, however, the Committee of Ministers has had little to
do under Article 32. In the First and Second Cyprus Cases,'87 the
London and Zurich agreements'88 settling the dispute relieved the
Ministers of any obligation to arrive at a decision. The Commit-
tee of Ministers has rarely rendered a decision finding the exist-
ence of violations of the Convention.' 8 In the first of the cases in
which it did find violations, the Greek Case, the Ministers found
Greece to have violated Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of
the Convention and Article 3 of the First Protocol."' As Greece
had repudiated the Convention and withdrawn from the Council
of Europe, the only action the Ministers would take was to pub-
lish the Report of the Commission and to urge the Greek govern-
ment to restore human rights and freedoms and to refrain from
torture.
The second instance of deliberations under Article 32 con-
cerned applications against Belgium'"' and involved the enforce-
182. Convention, art. 28(a).
183. Id. arts. 28(b), 30.
184. Id. art. 32(1).
185. Id.
186. Id. art. 51.
187. [1958-591 Y.B. at 186, 196.
188. See id.
189. See Res. DH(72)1, [1972] Y.B. 694; Res. DH(70)1, [1969] Y.B., GREEK CASE
511.
190. Res. DH(70)1, para. 12A, [1969] Y.B.: GREEK CASE at 512.
191. La Haye v. Belgium, App. No. 2251/65, De Wilde v. Belgium, App. No. 3155/67,




ment of vagrancy laws. The Committee of Ministers agreed with
the Commission that the Belgian law did not conform to the
provisions of Article 5(4) of the Convention. Nevertheless, no ac-
tion was taken since Belgium undertook legislative measures to
bring the domestic law into conformity with the Convention. 9 '
On two other occasions the Ministers received reports from the
Commission in which the Commission found violations of the
Convention. 9 3 In both instances the State respondent, Austria,
had taken steps to bring domestic law and practice into conform-
ity with the Convention. In light of these steps the Committee of
Ministers held that "no further measures need be taken. ... 194
The Committee of Ministers has not yet been faced with the
necessity of ordering a High Contracting Party to take specific
measures under Article 32(2). Nevertheless, with the notable ex-
ception of the Greek Case, there has been de facto compliance
with the Convention because member States have voluntarily
revised their domestic legislation to conform with the provisions
of the Convention. In the only interstate case which required a
decision by the Committee of Ministers other than the Greek
Case, Austria v. Italy,'95 the Ministers found no violation of the
Convention, but recommended clemency for the applicant.' It
should be noted that the Committee of Ministers has always fol-
lowed the opinion of a majority of the Commission. 9 ' Thus in
practice it is the Commission which determines actual violations.
m1. ARTICLE 25: INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS TO THE COMMISSION
Perhaps the two most significant articles of the Convention
are Articles 24 and 25, which concern the right of petition by a
State and by an individual. Both articles embody provisions
which are novel under international law, and which significantly
expand the rights of States and individuals in the international
legal context.
The traditional position of the individual in international
law has been that of an "object," as any inanimate object under
192. Res. DH(72)l, [1972] Y.B. 694, 698.
193. Res. (63)DH2, [19631 Y.B. 736; Res. (64)DH1, [1964] Y.B. 434.
194. [1964] Y.B. at 440.
195. Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, [1961] Y.B. 116 (Pfunders Case).
196. [1963] Y.B. 800.
197. See, e.g., Res. (65)DH1, [1965] Y.B. 464; Res. (67)DH1, [1967] Y.B: 694.
19771
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
the jurisdiction of a State.'98 Today, however, the individual
within the European Convention system does indeed possess
rights under international law and the means whereby violations
of those rights may be brought to the attention of the European
community.
An historical precedent for the right of individual petition is
to be found in the 1908 adoption by the Central American Peace
Conference of a Convention for the Establishment of a Central
American Court of Justice.'9 The Convention granted the indi-
vidual the right to petition the Court against any member State
save his own. 2 0 Although the individual was granted the right to
petition directly to an international court, a right denied in the
European Convention, the innovative character of the Central
American Court was diminished by the fact that only five cases
were submitted, and were all declared inadmissible.29 '
The right granted by Article 25 of the European Convention
is one unparalleled in the history of international law: the right
of individual petition against a sovereign State before a suprana-
tional tribunal. 212 In a move conveying the individual far beyond
his traditional status in international law, there now exists a
substantive right to act on one's behalf to defend and to vindicate
one's own rights. Such vindication includes the right to demand
compensation as a consequence of a violation of those rights.
The right of individual application, however, is not unequi-
vocal. The proviso contained in Article 25(1), requiring a State's
acceptance of the right, effectively conditions individual petition
upon the consent of the State concerned. Such a condition may
have the ultimate effect of thwarting the purpose of the Conven-
tion: the guarantee of individual human rights. History has dem-
onstrated that the bulk of human rights violations have been
committed by the State, acting against its citizens.2 3 Thus, to
impose such a condition upon the right of individual petition is
198. P. JESSuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15 (1948); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 79,
at 346.
199. M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 35-70 (1943).
200. Id. at 49.
201. Id. at 52.
202. The phraseology "any person, non-governmental organization, or group.
is evocative of Article 1 in that nationality has not been made a prerequisite for coverage
by the Convention, but rather that the rights of the Convention are guaranteed to any
person within the borders of the State.
203. HuMAN PGHTS m EUROPE, supra note 14, at 51.
[Vol. IHI:2
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
to exalt the formal right of petition over the practical substance
of the right.
Not surprisingly, the Consultative Assembly was a fervent
supporter of the right of individual petition during the debates on
establishing the Convention.2 14 On the other hand, the Committee
of Ministers, the body representing member governments, natu-
rally viewed the right with some trepidation. An attempt was
made by the Consultative Assembly to require a separate declara-
tion denying the right of individual petition instead of requiring
separate declarations of acceptance. 215 The nationalist predisposi-
tions of the Ministers prevailed, and the right of individual peti-
tion was granted in its present form.
The provision for nonacceptance notwithstanding, the right
of individual petition is a step of great importance. Heretofore a
State could not be called to account for its action involving indi-
viduals within its boundaries. Now an individual may place his
case, alleging a violation of his rights, before the larger com-
munity of European States. Regional institutions now exist for
the redress of individual rights. The State no longer enjoys exclu-
sive locus standi before international tribunals.
Unfortunately, some States have availed themselves of the
opportunity to refuse to accept the right of individual applica-
tion. Cyprus, Greece, Malta, France, and Turkey have not yet
accepted the right of individual petition.26 The United Kingdom
did not accept the right until 1966 and then did so only in regard
to Northern Ireland and Great Britain.2 7 This right has since
been extended to sixteen territories for which the United King-
dom is responsible in international relations. It must be noted,
however, that of the eighteen members who have ratified the
Convention,2"8 thirteen have accepted the right of individual
petition-in itself an achievement of note.
On May 6, 1969, a further step in the international protection
of human rights was taken with the signature in London of the
European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Pro-
ceedings of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights.0 9 This agreement, unique in international law, provides
204. WEIL, supra note 21, at 91.
205. EuR. CONSULT. ASS'Y, OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES, 2D SESS., cited in WEIL, id.
206. [1975] Y.B. 28-30.
207. Id. at 30.
208. Id. at 28-30.
209. [1969] Y.B. 2.
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facilities and immunities regarding speech, correspondence, and
movement to persons taking part in proceedings before the Com-
mission or the Court. The agreement further amplifies the Article
25 requirement that contracting States refrain from hindering the
effective exercise of the right of individual petition.
The rules and procedures of the Commission provide that
individual applicants may have the assistance of counsel. 10 Ap-
plications will be considered in the order received unless the
Commission determines that a case should be given precedence
or that cases should be joined."' Moreover, a language other than
French or English may be used.2 12 Provision for the remuneration
of witnesses and counsel is also made; witnesses called by the
individual applicant will be reimbursed by the Commission for
their expenses as will counsel if the applicant is unable to afford
it.213 An application must mention the name of the individual
applicant, the State against which the claim is made, the object
of the claim, the provision of the Convention allegedly violated,
a statement of facts and arguments, and any pertinent docu-
ments and information showing that the conditions of Article 26
concerning admissibility have been satisfied.1 If damages are
claimed, the amount may be stated in the application.
Initially the rules of the Commission provided for the estab-
lishment of three-member groups as an instrument for winnowing
out frivolous applications."5 If the group was unanimous as to
admissibility, notice was sent to the respondent; if not, the ple-
nary Commission would either declare the application inadmis-
sible or request the observations of the respondent State before
arriving at a decision. As a result of amendments to the rules in
1973, '21 the three-member group was replaced by a member of the
Commission acting as Rapporteur who is to examine the applica-
tion, request any relevant information, and draw up a report
containing the facts, issues, and a reasoned proposal as to admis-
sibility. The Commission, upon consideration of this report, shall
210. Rule 26, supra note 68.
211. Rule 28, id.
212. Rule 24, id.
213. Rule 32, id.
214. Rule 38, id.
215. Rule 34, prior to deletion by amendment in 1973, [1973] Y.B. 6.
216. Id. at 4.
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either declare the application inadmissible2 17 or request further
information."8
From 1955, when the Commission became empowered to
consider individual applications, to 1975, a total of 7,313 applica-
tions had been registered. Of these, 5,918 were declared inadmis-
sible de plano, and 291 were declared inadmissible in the course
of examination of the merits or after communication with the
respondent State. One hundred thirty-one applications were de-
clared admissible. Nine such applications were resolved through
friendly settlement and thirty-one applications were referred to
the Committee of Ministers. 219
Despite the novelty of its provisions, Article 25 contains both
implicit and explicit non-procedural limitations upon the right of
petition in addition to the procedural ones described above. It is
a principle of international law that treaties are not to be applied
retroactively. 21° The Commission has availed itself of this rule
in declaring applications inadmissible on the basis of ratione
temporis if the actions complained of took place prior to the entry
into force of the Convention with respect to State respondents, or
prior to the declaration of acceptance of the right of individual
petition.22' As illustrated by Table I, the number of applications
declared inadmissible ratione temporis has necessarily dimin-
ished over time. However, in the event that States not party to
the Convention or not now accepting individual petition do so in
the future, the question of admissibility ratione temporis will
undoubtedly be raised again.
217. Rules 39, 40, supra note 68.
218. Rule 42, id.
219. [1975] Y.B. 284.
220. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (1965).
221. See, e.g., De Courcy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2749/66, [1967] Y.B. 368;
X v. Belgium, App. No. 347/58, [1958-59] Y.B. 407; X v. Federal Republic of Germany,
App. No. 115/55, [1955-57] EuR. COMM'N 137.
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Not all individuals may apply to the Commission. An indi-
vidual applicant under Article 25 must allege to be the "victim
of violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights
set forth in the Convention."' 2 The Commission has stated that
"Article 25 . . . refers not only to the direct victim . . . but
moreover all indirect victims to which the violation would cause
a prejudice. '22 4 The Commission on a subsequent application de-
clared that an individual or financial interest in the case is suffi-
cient to qualify the applicant as a victim.2 1 The Commission has
taken the position that a corporation is not a person guaranteed
human rights by the Convention and therefore cannot be a vic-
tim. 26 There seems to be no definite rule as to what, besides
"indirect prejudice" or a personal or financial interst, qualifies an
individual as an indirect victim. The Commission might be sub-
ject to criticism for lack of precision and clarity on this point, but
it appears that leaving the question open may give the Commis-
sion more room to accommodate individuals alleging to be vic-
tims.
A further non-procedural criterion of admissibility requires
that the State alleged to have violated the Convention be a party
to the Convention.22 7 The great volume of litigation concerning
tribunals established by United States occupation authorities to
handle restitution as a result of World War II was one of the early
concerns of the Commission. In each case the Federal Republic
of Germany was named as the party respondent, and the issue
concerned responsibility for those tribunals. The Commission
held that as Germany was not responsible for these tribunals, it
was not responsible for any alleged violations of rights by these
tribunals.28 As the tribunals were clearly not States subject to the
223. Convention, art. 25.
224. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 282/57, [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N
164.
225. X v. Austria, App. No. 1706/62, [1966] Y.B. 112, 114.
226. Church of X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3798/68, [1969] Y.B. 306.
227. Convention, arts. 24, 25. See X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No.
262/57, [1955-57] EuR. COMM'N 170, in which the applicant accused West Germany of
violating the Convention. The Commission determined that the violation had been com-
mitted by Czechoslovakia.
228. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 235/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 256; X v.
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obligations of the Convention, the applications were declared in-
admissible ratione personae. Applications have also been filed
listing individuals as parties respondent, a situation outside the
scope of the Convention. These, too, have been declared inadmis-
sible ratione personae.2 1
Numerous applications have been filed alleging violations of
rights not protected by the Convention. Applications of this sort
are declared inadmissible ratione materiae. The Commission has
held that rights such as the rights to appeal, to work, to teach,
and the right to. remission of sentence are not rights guaranteed
by the Convention. 0
The Commission has shown itself unwilling to go beyond the
written word of the Convention and, in the tradition of the United
States Supreme Court, to develop rights as emanations of other
rights. For the Commission to do so would be to court disaster.
The main strength of the Commission and the Convention rests
upon acceptance of their decisions by the contracting parties. To
go beyond what the parties have actually consented to would be
reckless and would ultimately result in a diminishing of the effec-
tiveness of the Commission.
IV. ARTIcLE 24: INTERSTATE APPLICATIONS TO THE COMMISSION
Article 24 provides that any contracting State may file an
application charging another High Contracting Party with a
breach of the Convention.ml Unlike individual applications under
Article 25, the State respondent is immediately and automati-
cally notified of the allegation and is requested to transmit its
views on the admissibility of the complaint. Obviously an inter-
state application is accorded significantly more weight than one
under Article 25.
There is no mention in either Article 24 or the Commission's
rules of requirements as to the nationality of individuals on whose
Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 182/56, [1955-57] EuR. COMM'N 167.
229. See, e.g., De Courcy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2749/66, [1967] Y.B. 368;
X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2646/65 [1966] Y.B. 484.
230. See note 120 supra.
231. The reference to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe in Article 24
emphasizes the administrative relationship between the Council and the Commission. In
filing a complaint under Article 24, the parties must be represented by agents or advo-
cates, (Rule 25); the application must be in writing and signed (Rule 37); and must
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behalf the State may make allegations. Thus, in a departure from
traditional practice in international law, any contracting State
may champion the rights of any individual residing within the
jurisdiction of any member State rather than merely acting on
behalf of one of its nationals. Inherent in this article is the possi-
bility of transforming a complaint concerning an individual into
an interstate dispute. Since the entry into force of the Convention
in 1953, there have been nine applications filed under Article 24,
as shown in Table 11. The number is deceiving, however, in that
the complaints concerned only four distinct areas; certain com-
plaints concerned the same problem.
A. The First and Second Cyprus Cases
The first two applications under Article 24 were filed by
Greece, and concerned the Greek Cypriot community on Cyprus,
then under British control.233 The first application, filed May 7,
1965, alleged that the government of Cyprus, by promulgating
certain exceptional administrative and legal measures, had
breached the Convention. The fact that the United Kingdom had
filed a derogation under Article 15 was not viewed by Greece as
sufficient cause to justify the actions taken. The application was
declared admissible by the Commission. Pursuant to Article 29,
a subcommission was formed and sessions held, including hear-
ings on Cyprus itself. Of special import is the fact that the hear-
ings on Cyprus were held for the purpose of ascertaining the "ex-
istence and extent of the controversy.12 4 A final report was sub-
mitted to the Committee of Ministers, pursuant to the provisions
of Article 31. However, political events overtook the situation,
and with the London and Zurich agreements2 5 settling the "Cy-
prus question," the Greek and British governments proposed ces-
sation of action on the application.233 The Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe thus decided that "in accordance with
Article 32. . . no further action [was] called for."
Especially noteworthy in this case is the fact that the sub-
commission took upon itself the responsibility of determining the
existence and extent of the emergency cited under Article 15. The
233. Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 174; Greece v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 299/57 [1958-59] Y.B. 178.
234. HuMAN RIGHTS IN EuRoPE, supra note 14, at 59.
235. See [1958-59] Y.B. at 186, 196.
236. Id.
237. Res. (59)12, adopted Apr. 20, 1959, [1958-59] Y.B. 186.
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power to determine the existence of such a state of affairs has
traditionally been the prerogative of the State, one which is af-
firmed in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter,
forbidding intervention into matters "essentially within domestic
jurisdiction." In this instance, however, a separate determination
by a supranational body as to the existence and exigencies of a
domestic emergency was made. The State in question, Great
Britain, not only acquiesced but provided facilities and enacted
legislation conferring diplomatic immunities and privileges upon
members of the Commission acting in the exercise of their du-
ties.23 The importance of this event in terms of the extension of
international control of human rights through international law,
especially at that time, cannot be disregarded. It indicates that
the judgment of the State regarding internal conditions may be
displaced and superceded by the judgment of a supranational
body, and that the decision of the latter has standing in interna-
tional law.
The Second Cyprus Case,'3 involving the same parties, con-
cerned allegations of forty-nine instances of ill-treatment or tor-
ture for which the government of Cyprus was allegedly responsi-
ble. The application was declared admissible with regard to
twenty-nine of the alleged acts. However,'the London and Zurich
agreements were signed prior to the selection of a subcommission,
and at the request of the parties, the Commission terminated
the proceedings without considering the merits of the case.,, The
Committee of Ministers noted the action of the Commission and,
as in the First Cyprus Case, resolved that "no further action
[was] called for."'241
The third interstate case was filed by Austria against Italy
on July 11, 1960. This case, known as the Pfunders Case,242 alleged
maladministration of justice in the trial of 'six young men accused
of murdering an Italian customs officer. The accused resided in
the village of Pfunders in the South Tyrol. Austria had an interest
in the pro-Austrian population of this region and, in this case, was
undoubtedly acting to protect and further that interest.243 The
application alleged that irregularities in the procedures of the
238. Statute Laws of Cyprus, No. 1 (1958), reprinted in id. at 198.
239. Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 299/57, [1958-59] Y.B. 178. The Commis-
sion declared portions of the application inadmissible because the applicant had failed to
exhaust domestic remedies under Article 26.
240. Res. (59)32, adopted Dec. 14, 1959, [1958-59] Y.B. 196.
241. Id.
242. [19601 Y.B. 168. See App. No. 788/60, [1961] Y.B. 116.
243. F. CASTBERG, supra note 111, at 32 (1974).
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trial violated the European Convention, particularly Article 6,
which provides for a fair trial.
After considering the pleadings of both sides concerning
admissibility, the Commission declared the application admissi-
ble with respect to Article 6(2), presumption of innocence; Article
6(3) (d), the hearing of witnesses; and Article 14, nondiscrimi-
nation.244 The Commission declared inadmissible those portions
of the application dealing with Article 6(1), the right to a fair
hearing, holding that failure to seek a change in venue was, under
the circumstances, failure to exhaust domestic remedies.245
In its report to the Committee of Ministers, the Commission
held that discrimination against the defendants because of their
linguistic and ethnic group was the key issue in the case. The
Commission, however, found no such discrimination, 2"1 and the
Committee of Ministers reached the same conclusion. 47
In ruling on the admissibility of the application, the Com-
mission had occasion to comment upon the nature of the Conven-
tion and the purposes for which it was drawn. Italy maintained
that because the incidents in issue occurred prior to Austrian
ratification of the Convention, the application was inadmissible
ratione temporis, as being lodged out of time. The Commission
held that reciprocity and equality of rights were not the purposes
of the Convention, which sought instead the application of a
collective guarantee and the protection of the public order of
Europe.248 This holding greatly strengthened the position of the
individual in the European human rights sytem by removing
the Convention from the traditional arena of State treaties and
placing it in the sphere where individual and human rights are
accorded the status of treaty subjects.249
B. The Greek Case
The interstate case having the most far-reaching effect, but
also the one illustrating the ultimate weakness of the Convention
system arose from the military coup of April 21, 1967, which top-
pled the popularly-constituted Greek government. A group of
244. [1961] Y.B. 116 (decision of the Commission as to admissibility).
245. Id. at 166-70.
246. [1963] Y.B. 794.
247. Res. (63)DH3, adopted Oct. 23, 1963, id. at 796.
248. [1961] Y.B. at 140.
249. The traditional view is that the individual has no claim as a "subject" under
international law. Only States are said to be "subjects" of international law; individuals
are its "objects." P. JESSUP, supra note 202, at 15. See also text accompanying notes 198.
230 supra for a discussion of the right of individual petition.
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military officers claiming to act in the national interest of
Greece 5 seized the reins of government in April 1967. Immedi-
ately, provisions of the Constitution were suspended 51 and laws
were promulgated to thwart the alleged communist threat.22 As
a result of these actions and in response to a torrent of reports of
violations of rights guaranteed by the Convention, the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe, on July 23, 1967, urged
member States of the Council to refer the "Greek question" to the
European Commission of Human Rights. 2 3 Denmark, 254 Nor-
way,25 Sweden, 256 and the Netherlands257 heeded this request and
exercised their right under Article 24 to bring alleged violations
of the Convention to the attention of the Commission through the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
The applications alleged violations of Article 5, personal lib-
erty and security; Article 6, fair trial; Article 8, respect for private
and family life; Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; Article 11, freedom of peaceful assembly; Article 13, the
right to effective legal remedies to secure rights; and Article 14,
freedom from discrimination. The applications further alleged
that the Greek military government had not shown that deroga-
tion from the Convention under Article 15 was justified.258 Nor-
way, Sweden, and Denmark extended their original allegations to
include Articles 3 and 7 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 3
of the First Protocol.259
On January 24, 1968, the initial applications were declared
admissible over the strenuous objections of the Greek military
government.20 The second set of applications were declared ad-
missible on May 3, 1968, following proceedings in which the
Greek government refused to participate. 21 The Committee of
Ministers duly received the report of the Commission but was
250. Letter of Sept. 19, 1967, to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from
the Permanent Representative of Greece, reprinted in [1968] Y.B. 704-10.
251. Royal Decree No. 280, reprinted in [1967] Y.B. 28-36.
252. [1969] Y.B., GREEK CASE 26.
253. [1967] Y.B. 94.
254. Denmark v. Greece, App. No. 3321/67, [1967] Y.B. 586.
255. Norway v. Greece, App. No. 3322/67, id.
256. Sweden v. Greece, App. No. 3323/67, id.
257. Netherlands v. Greece, App. No. 3344/67, id. The Commission joined the four
applications against Greece.
258. [1969] Y.B., GREEK CASE 59.
259. The extension was treated by the Commission as constituting a separate appli-
cation, App. No. 4448/70, [1970] Y.B. 110.
260. Denmark v. Greece, App. Nos. 3321-23/67, 3344/67, [1968] Y.B. 690.
261. Id. at 730.
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faced with a situation not envisioned in the Convention-the
withdrawal of a member State against whom allegations of
human rights violations had been filed.2 6 2
The withdrawal of Greece from the Convention system and
from the Council of Europe rendered moot the only means of
compelling compliance with the Convention: the threat of expul-
sion. Therefore the only alternative remaining open to the Com-
mittee of Ministers was to publish its decision finding Greece in
violation of Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of the Conven-
tion and Article 3 of the First Protocol.263 This case represents the
first instance of the filing of interstate applications in which the
States lodging the complaints were not acting either on behalf of
a national minority with which they had ties, or within the con-
text of a contumacious political dispute. A degree of maturity and
a sincere and dispassionate concern for human rights were the
motivating forces.
Another aspect of the case is, however, less than positive.
The Convention did not achieve one of its desired results-the
prevention of the emergence of dictatorship in Europe. Although
the military, in carrying out a coup d'6tat, would naturally disre-
gard the law, it had been assumed that the force of the Conven-
tion would have contributed to a greater value being placed on
human rights and democracy, and would have prevented such a
coup. Moreover, activities by non-European entities had un-
doubtedly weakened the Greek democracy and supplied an im-
plied sanction to the usurpation of power by the military.,
To a limited degree, though, the Convention served as a
moderating force in Greece, not by itself but in conjunction with
public pressure. Greece, albeit in a limited and begrudging fash-
ion, responded'to such pressure. In some instances torture of indi-
viduals was halted and the victims released. One such incident
involved Antonios Ambetielos, leader of the Greek Communists.
The very fact that a regime, whose raison d'8tre was to combat
the "communist threat," would release the leader of the "threat"
indicates a certain sensitivity to public opinion.
Although the final relationship of Greece with the Commis-
sion was that of total noncooperation, the initial response fluc-
262. Res. DH(70)(1), para. 19, adopted Apr. 15, 1970, [1969] Y.B., GREEK CASE 511,
513.
263. Id. at para. 12A.
264. See Karnow, America's Mediterranean Bungle, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1975,
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tuated between obstruction, and hesitant and fitful cooperation.
A team was dispatched by the Commission to visit Greece in
order to hold on-site investigations. Greek authorities received
the team reluctantly, and for a short time allowed it access only
to certain witnesses.265 Soon, however, even this limited coopera-
tion ceased, but the very fact that an outside body was allowed
to enter Greece for the purpose of conducting an investigation of
serious allegations against the government reflects a certain dis-
inclination on the part of Greece to reject the Convention and
thereby reject the European community.
The Greek Case may be scrutinized from yet another
perspective. Perhaps it would be too much to expect that the
European Convention on Human Rights would be endowed with
an aura sufficient to deter a fanatic cabal of military officers
sympathetic to fascism. But rather than preventing a coup, could
not the Convention serve as a moderating force, blunting the
excesses of dictatorship? And through its provisions for enforce-
ment and utilization of a form of European peer group pressure,
could it not foster a minimal level of compliance with the provi-
sions of the Convention?
In this case, unfortunately, the potency of the Convention in
terms of mitigation and amelioration was meager. A formal re-
turn to minimal protection of human rights in Greece was accom-
plished not through the moderating force of the Convention, not
by the Council of Europe or the European community, but
through the shortsighted acts of a military dictator which
plunged another State, Cyprus, into the abyss of occupation and
dismemberment. It may be observed that the Convention works
best as a legal instrument binding democratic regimes; a treaty
standing alone is insufficient to stem a determined fascist minor-
ity in command of the armed might of a nation.
C. Ireland v. United Kingdom
The interstate application of Ireland against Great Britain is
a reversion to the previous pattern reflecting a concern with na-
tional minorities and self-interest. Ireland filed an application
against the United Kingdom in order to ascertain if actions of the
United Kingdom violated the Convention and to ensure compli-
ance with the Convention.26 Compensation was not an issue; the
265. [1969] Y.B., GREEK CASE 14.
266. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, [1972] Y.B. 92, 94.
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government of Ireland objected to the provisions of the Special
Powers Act of 1922267 and the statutory rules, regulations, and
orders made thereunder.6 8 It was alleged that implementation of
the Special Powers Act constituted an administrative practice
involving breaches of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 14 of the Conven-
tion.
On June 27, 1957, the United Kingdom filed a derogation
under Article 15 concerning the situation in Northern Ireland."6 '
In a 1971 letter to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe,
it further emphasized the state of emergency and indicated that,
in view of the terrorist threat, a policy of extensive detention and
internment was to be implemented. 0
The Commission, on October 1, 1972, declared the applica-
tion inadmissible regarding the alleged violations of Articles 1, 5,
6, and 14.2' That portion of the application dealing with Article
2 was also declared inadmissible.2 12 A second application was
eliminated after being withdrawn by the applicant .2 7 This appli-
cation had alleged that the Northern Ireland Act of 197274 consti-
tuted a breach of Article 1 by denying the rights guaranteed in
Article 7 to the residents of Northern Ireland through the creation
of an ex post facto law. The Attorney General of the United King-
dom stated at an oral hearing before the Commission that no
individual would be found guilty under the 1972 Act if the act or
omission did not constitute a criminal offense at the time it oc-
curred. In light of these assurances, the government of Ireland
withdrew the application and the Commission, finding no reason
to the contrary, struck this second case off the list. 5
The case of Ireland v. United Kingdom is still pending before
the European Court of Human Rights. In its report, the Commis-
sion had found that five techniques of interrogation utilized by
the British constituted a breach of Article 3, inhuman treatment
267. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(Jan. 25, 1976), at 15.
268. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, [1972] Y.B. at 94.
269. [1955-57] EUR. COMM'N 50.
270. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, [1972] Y.B. at 256.
271. Id. at 240, 254-56.
272. Id. at 254.
273. Id. at 254-56.
274. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(Jan. 25, 1976), annex at 121.
275. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, [1972] Y.B. 254.
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and torture.276 In proceedings before the Court, Britain conceded
that the five techniques of torture had indeed been employed, and
pledged that such techniques would not be used again. 27
D. Cyprus v. Turkey
On July 15, 1974 a right-wing coup was attempted on Cyprus.
Archbishop Makarios escaped assassination and fled Cyprus. In
response, Turkey dispatched army units to Cyprus, ultimately
taking control of forty percent of the island and causing a massive
flow of refugees toward Greek Cypriot-held territory. 8 As a result
of this action by Turkey, and in response to actions of the Turkish
army and authorities taken during and following the occupation,
the Republic of Cyprus (in reality the Greek Cypriot members of
the Cypriot government) filed two applications against Turkey
under Article 24.279
These applications alleged breaches by Turkey of Articles 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, and 17, and Article 1 of the First Protocol.
In addition, Article 14 was cited, charging that all the alleged
violations, such as murder, rape, arbitrary detention, torture, and
robbery, were based on the ethnic origin, race, and religion of the
victims.?0 Turkey, in the hearings on admissibility, maintained
that the applications were inadmissible because the government
of Cyprus was illegal;2"' that Turkey was not responsible for any
activities on Cyprus;2 2 that domestic remedies were available;
23
and finally, that the application was an "abuse of procedure of
the Convention. ' 284 The Commission disputed the objections of
Turkey25 and "without prejudging the merits of the case" de-
clared the applications admissible. 5
The Commission has completed its report on this case, but
has not yet published it. A "leaked" version appeared in London
allegedly finding Turkey in violation of, inter alia, Articles 2, 3,
and 8.21 If these reports are valid, the disposition of this case will
276. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(Jan. 25, 1976), at 490, 517.
277. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1977, at A3, col. 1.
278. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 6780/74, [1975] Y.B. 82, 86.
279. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, id. at 82.
280. Id. at 88.
281. Id. at 94-96.
282. Id. at 98.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 114, 116, 120, 122, respectively.
286. Id. at 124.
287. Sunday Times (London), Jan. 23, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
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undoubtedly have political repercussions on both the Convention
system and the Council of Europe.
The Commission has held that the Human Rights Conven-
tion is not a treaty in the usual sense of reciprocal rights, but is
a mutual guarantee, 88 imbedded in Article 24, of what may be
termed a "reciprocal right to interfere" in the domestic affairs of
the contracting States. This is a concession with far-reaching
implications. The granting of a right to a State to complain to a
supranational body of conditions or events within the domestic
sphere of another State is indicative of the existence of a certain
degree of mutual trust and sincerity as well as an affirmation that
great importance is given to relations with other contracting
States. It is obvious that the existence of such a "right to inter-
fere" will tend to encourage the maintenance of amiable rela-
tions.
Indeed, such a right may be considered to be a reflection of
the shared heritage, outlook, traditions, and political and social
mores of the nations involved. The mere existence of such a right
evidences a large degree of understanding which must precede
such an undertaking. Perhaps the presence of the factors neces-
sary for the undertaking and acceptance of Article 24 also reflects
the possibility that activity under that article might be the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The Convention is a treaty signed by European States having
a "common heritage of political traditions and ideals." ' The
scars of Nazism, the threat of Stalinism, and the desire for a
united Europe were in large part the motivating factors leading
those sovereign States to agree to a Convention which, it was
hoped, would deter individual dictatorship and tyranny from
once again taking root in European soil. These States and the
Council of Europe perceived an unseverable bond between the
protection of human rights and the advancement of a democratic
order. The Preamble to the Convention states, inter alia, that the
aim of the Convention is to "pursue the maintenance and further
realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."
Thus the Convention may be assessed from two perspectives.
The first concerns the effectiveness of the Convention as a
"higher law," or a measure by which the domestic law of the
288. See Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, [1961] Y.B. at 138 (Pfunders Case).
289. Preamble to the Convention.
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member States may be scrutinized. From this vantage point, it
is possible to observe whether the democracies of Europe are will-
ing to abide by an international treaty even if such adherence has
decidedly internal ramifications. Such ramifications may include
the questioning by an individual of the validity of domestic legis-
lation or practices before an international organ. And if the legis-
lation or practice in question is found wanting, the State, accord-
ing to the Convention, may be required to take corrective action,
ranging from the payment of reparations to alteration of the law.
This view may be termed the ordinary or the legal perspective.
The second perspective, which differs greatly from the ordi-
nary or legal, concerns the usefulness of the Convention as a
treaty protecting human rights in situations in which the delicate
fabric of democracy is either threatened or destroyed. This admit-
tedly extraordinary situation arises not from the day-to-day ad-
ministration of the laws or the vibrant dynamics of a democratic
society, but from attacks on the very order of that society.
From the ordinary vantage point, the Convention must be
termed a success. Not only have eighteen States ratified the Con-
vention, but the great majority of these States have accepted the
right of individual application and the jurisdiction of the Court.
The domestic laws of member States have been challenged under
the Convention, and the States, by appearing before the Commis-
sion as a party to the proceedings, have accepted the Convention
as superior law. In numerous instances, domestic legislation has
been altered or amended to remove any conflict with the Conven-
tion. Furthermore, this realignment of domestic legislation has
come about as a result of individual appeals to the Commission.
The De Becker Case29 led to a change in the Belgian law regard-
ing denial of freedom of expression subsequent to conviction of
collaboration. The Ofner,29 1 Hopfinger, 9 2 Pataki,2 93 and
Dunshirn294 cases led to changes in Austrian criminal procedure
law including equality of arms on appeal (equal opportunity of
the parties to present their cases) as well as modification of deten-
tion on remand. Domestic law in the United Kingdom was
amended with regard to naval enlistment and period of service,
and to provide for legal challenge to denials of immigrant entry.95
290. De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, [1958-59] Y.B. 214.
291. Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, [1963] Y.B. 676.
292. Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 617/59, id.
293. Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 596/59, [19631 Y.B. 714.
294. Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No. 789/60, id.
295. F. JACOBS, THs EURoPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS 43 (1975).
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Vagabonds in the Netherlands, as a result of the Vagrancy
Cases, 29 were given the right to contest the legality of their con-
finement.2 7 A further indication of the impact of the Convention
upon domestic legislation is the creation of a civil service organ
in the Federal Republic of Germany, charged with the duty of
ascertaining whether proposed legislation is in compliance with
the Convention.298
Thus it is fair to say that the Convention has had a salutary
effect on domestic legislation and practice. Laws have been
changed to conform with the Convention. Reparations have been
paid for violations, and proposed laws are scrutinized prior to
passage to ensure conformity with the Convention. On this plane,
the ordinary or legal, it has proven to be an effectual dynamic
body of law.
From the extraordinary vantage point, or that which tran-
scends the purely legal and includes aspects of politics and state-
craft, the picture is necessarily clouded. The Greek Case
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Convention in preventing
a dictatorial eruption on the European scene. The junta which
seized power systematically violated the spirit, as well as the
great majority of the rights protected by the Convention. To con-
clude from this phenomenon that the Convention is mere ver-
biage is to beg the question. The Convention is a treaty binding
upon civilized European democracies. It guarantees rights pre-
cious to all humanity, rights which form the corpus of democracy.
It is obvious, however, that the range of rights guaranteed in the
Convention are susceptible to protection and promotion only in
pluralistic democracies based on the rule of law.
When, therefore, the military coup occurred in Greece, an
anomolous situation arose. An anti-democratic government was
responsible, under the Convention, for the maintenance and pro-
tection of democratic virtues and rights. To expect compliance
with the Convention in this situation is tantamount to expecting
the wolf to nurture the lamb.
On the other hand, while it is unrealistic to expect the Con-
vention to be effective after a collapse of democracy, may we not
expect the Convention as an international treaty to protect de-
296. De Wilde v. Belgium, App. No. 2832/66, Ooms v. Belgium, App. No. 2835/66,
Versyp v. Belgium, App. No. 2899/66, [1967] Y.B. 420.
297. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
SER. A, at para. 79 (1971) (Vagrancy Cases).
298. A.H. ROBERTSON, PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS 358 (1973).
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mocracy and prevent the rise of a dictatorship? Here it appears
one must acknowledge an inherent weakness of law, especially
international law. Although there is no doubt that the coup in
Greece violated the spirit as well as specific provisions of the
Convention, little could be done within the framework of the legal
system.
The Convention, as a legal instrument, is binding prospec-
tively, but in the event of violations, it is reactive rather than
preventive. With the benefit of hindsight, the only means of pre-
venting the Greek tragedy would have been either extraordinary
political measures or armed force. The Convention is merely a
legal document and, in the international sphere, derives its
strength from consent. Moreover, the Convention, to paraphrase
Stalin, commands no divisions. Nevertheless, the actions of the
complainant States in referring the Greek Case to the Commis-
sion, and the courage and diligence of the Commission in
investigating the allegations and in arriving at the finding of vio-
lations, represent an emphatic demonstration of the willingness
of the European community to protect human rights.
19771,
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
APPENDIX
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the
Council of Europe,
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
claimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th
December 1948;
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the uni-
versal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights
therein declared;
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the
achievement of greater unity between its Members and that one
of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the mainte-
nance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms;
Reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental
Freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the
world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective
political democracy and on the other by a common understanding
and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend;
Being resolved, as the Governments of European countries
which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first
steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated
in the Universal Declaration;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within




1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of
a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which
this penalty is provided by law.
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2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape
of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot
or insurrection.
Article 3
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.
Article 4
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or com-
pulsory labour" shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of
detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this
Convention or during conditional release from such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of consci-
entious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service
exacted instead of compulsory military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity
threatening the life or well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic
obligations.
Article 5
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a
competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-
compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure
the fulfilment of any obligation prescri'bd by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
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reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it
is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose
of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose
of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind,
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person
against whom action is being taken with the view to deportation
or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in
a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and
of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be condi-
tioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or de-
tention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawful-
ness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention
in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.
Article 6
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests
of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so
require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.
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2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he under-
stands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for
legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.
Article 7
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence under national or international law at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the
one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was
committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it
was committed, was criminal according to the general principles
of law recognised by civilised nations.
Article 8
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others.
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Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety,
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintain-
ing the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Article 11
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to freedom of association with others, including the right to
form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposi-
tion of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by mem-
[Vol. 11:2
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
bers of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of
the State.
Article 12
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry
and to found a family, according to the national laws governing
the exercise of this right.
Article 13
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Con-
vention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a na-
tional authority notwithstanding that the violation has been com-
mitted by persons acting in an official capacity.
Article 14
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status.
Article 15
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the ex-
tent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph
1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right
of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the
reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully exe-
cuted.
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Article 16
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as pre-
venting the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions
on the political activity of aliens.
Article 17
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity
or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater
extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Article 18
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said
rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other
than those for which they have been prescribed.
Section II
Article 19
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by
the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention, there
shall be set up:
(1) A European Commission of Human Rights hereinafter
referred to as "the Commission";
(2) A European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the Court".
Section III
Article 20
The Commission shall consist of a number of members equal
to that of the High Contracting Parties. No two members of the
Commission may be nationals of the same State.
Article 21
1. The members of the Commission shall be elected by the
Committee of Ministers by an absolute majority of votes, from a
list of names drawn up by the Bureau of the Consultative Assem-
bly; each group of the Representatives of the High Contracting
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Parties in the Consultative Assembly shall put forward three can-
didates, of whom two at least shall be its nationals.
2. As far as applicable, the same procedure shall be fol-
lowed to complete the Commission in the event of other States
subsequently becoming Parties to this Convention, and in filling
casual vacancies.
Article 221
1. The members of the Commission shall be elected for a
period of six years. They may be re-elected. However, of the mem-
bers elected at the first election, the terms of seven members shall
expire at the end of three years.
2. The members whose terms are to expire at the end of the
initial period of three years shall be chosen by lot by the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe immediately after the
first election has been completed.
3. In order to ensure that, as far as possible, one half of the
membership of the Commission shall be renewed every three
years, the Committee of Ministers may decide, before proceeding
to any subsequent election, that the term or terms of office of one
or more members to be elected shall be for a period other than
six years but not more than nine and not less than three years.
4. In cases where more than one term of office is involved
and the Committee of Ministers applies the preceding paragraph,
the allocation of the terms of office shall be effected by the draw-
ing of lots by the Secretary-General immediately after the elec-
tion.
5. A member of the Commission elected to replace a mem-
ber whose term of office has not expired shall hold office' for the
remainder of his predecessor's term.
6. The members of the Commission shall hold office until
replaced. After having been replaced, they shall continue to deal
with such cases as they already have under consideration.
Article 23
The members of the Commission shall sit on the Commission
in their individual capacity.
1. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article have been added in accordance with Article 1
of the Fifth Protocol to the Convention.
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Article 24
Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission,
through the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, any al-
leged breach of the provisions of the Convention by another High
Contracting Party.
Article 25
1. The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-
governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties
of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High
Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged
has declared that it recognises the competence of the Commission
to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties
who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any
way the effective exercise of this right.
2. Such declarations may be made for a specific period.
3. The declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe who shall transmit copies
thereof to the High Contracting Parties and publish them.
4. The Commission shall only exercise the powers provided
for in this Article when at least six High Contracting Parties are
bound by declarations made in accordance with the preceding
paragraphs.
Article 26
The Commission may only deal with the matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the gener-
ally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of
six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
Article 27
1. The Commission shall not deal with any petition submit-
ted under Article 25 which
(a) is anonymous, or
(b) is substantially the same as a matter which has already
been examined by the Commission or has already been submitted
to another procedure of international investigation or settlement
and if it contains no relevant new information.
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2. The Commission shall consider inadmissible any peti-
tion submitted under Article 25 which it considers incompatible
with the provisions of the present Convention, manifestly ill-
founded, or an abuse of the right of petition.
3. The Commission shall reject any petition referred to it
which it considers inadmissible under Article 26.
Article 28
In the event of the Commission accepting a petition referred
to it:
(a) it shall, with a view of ascertaining the facts, undertake
together with the representatives of the parties an examination
of the petition and, if need be, an investigation, for the effective
conduct of which the States concerned shall furnish all necessary
facilities, after an exchange of views with the Commission;
(b) it shall place itself at the disposal of the parties con-
cerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter
on the basis of respect for Human Rights as defined in this Con-
vention.
Article 292
After it has accepted a petition submitted under Article 25,
the Commission may nevertheless decide unanimously to reject
the petition if, in the course of its examination, it finds that the
existence of one of the grounds for non-acceptance provided for
in Article 27 has been established.
In such a case, the decision shall be communicated to the
parties.
Article 303
If the Commission succeeds in effecting a friendly settlement
in accordance with Article 28, it shall draw up a Report which
2. Text amended in accordance with Article 1 of the Third Protocol to the Conven-
tion. The original text of Article 29 read as follows:
"(1) The Commission shall perform the functions set out in Article 28 by
means of a Sub-Commission consisting of 7 members of the Commission.
(2) Each of the parties concerned may appoint as members of this Sub-
Commission a person of its choice.
(3) The remaining members shall be chosen by lot in accordance with ar-
rangements prescribed in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission."
3. Text amended in accordance with Article 2 of the Third Protocol to the Conven-
tion. The original text of Article 30 commenced with the words "If the Sub-Commission
succeeds . .. ."
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shall be sent to the States concerned, to the Committee of Minis-
ters and to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe for
publication. This Report shall be confined to a brief statement of
the facts and of the solution reached.
Article 31
1. If a solution is not reached, the Commission shall draw
up a Report on the facts and state its opinion as to whether the
facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obliga-
tions under the Convention. The opinions of all the members of
the Commission on this point may be stated in the Report.
2. The Report shall be transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers. It shall also be transmitted to the States concerned,
who shall not be at liberty to publish it.
3. In transmitting the Report to the Committee of Minis-
ters the Commission may make such proposals as it thinks fit.
Article 32
1. If the question is not referred to the Court in accordance
with Article 48 of this Convention within a period of three months
from the date of the transmission of the Report to the Committee
of Ministers, the Committee of Ministers shall decide by a major-
ity of two-thirds of the members entitled to sit on the Committee
whether there has been a violation of the Convention.
2. In the affirmative case the Committee of Ministers shall
prescribe a period during which the High Contracting Party con-
cerned must take the measures required by the decision of the
Committee of Ministers.
3. If the High Contracting Party concerned has not taken
satisfactory measures within the prescribed period, the Commit-
tee of Ministers shall decide by the majority provided for in para-
graph (1) above what effect shall be given to its original decision
and shall publish the Report.
4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to regard as
binding on them any decision which the Committee of Ministers
may take in application of the preceding paragraphs.
Article 33




Subject to the provisions of Article 29, the Commission shall
take its decisions by a majority of the Members present and vot-
ing.
Article 35
The Commission shall meet as the circumstances require.
The meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe.
Article 36
The Commission shall draw up its own rules of procedure.
Article 37
The secretariat of the Commission shall be provided by the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
Section IV
Article 38
The European Court of Human Rights shall consist of a num-
ber of judges equal to that of the Members of the Council of
Europe. No two judges may be nationals of the same State.
Article 39
1. The members of the Court shall be elected by the Con-
sultative Assembly by a majority of the votes cast from a list of
persons nominated by the Members of the Council of Europe;
each Member shall nominate three candidates, of whom two at
least shall be its nationals.
2. As far as applicable, the same procedure shall be fol-
lowed to complete the Court in the event of the admission of new
Members of the Council of Europe, and in filling casual vacan-
cies.
3. The candidates shall be of high moral character and
4. Text amended in accordance with Article 3 of the Third Protocol to the Conven-
tion. The original text of Article 34 read as follows:
"The Commission shall take its decisions by a majority of the Members present
and voting; the Sub-Commission shall take its decision by a majority of its
members."
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must either possess the qualifications required for appointment
to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised compe-
tence.
Article 405
1. The members of the Court shall be elected for a period
of nine years. They may be re-elected. However, of the members
elected at the first election the terms of four members shall expire
at the end of three years, and the terms of four more members
shall expire at the end of six years.
2. The members whose terms are to expire at the end of the
initial periods of three and six years shall be chosen by lot by the
Secretary-General immediately after the first election has been
completed.
3. In order to ensure that, as far as possible, one third of the
membership of the Court shall be renewed every three years, the
Consultative Assembly may decide, before proceeding to any sub-
sequent election, that the term or terms of office of one or more
members to be elected shall be for a period other than nine years
but not more than twelve and not less than six years.
4. In cases where more than one term of office is involved
and the Consultative Assembly applies the preceding paragraph,
the allocation of the terms of office shall be effected by the draw-
ing of lots by the Secretary-General immediately after the elec-
tion.
5. A member of the Court elected to replace a member
whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the
remainder of his predecessor's term.
6. The members of the Court shall hold office until re-
placed. After having been replaced, they shall continue to deal
with such cases as they already have under consideration.
Article 41
The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for a
period of three years. They may be re-elected.
Article 42
The members of the Court shall receive for each day of duty
a compensation to be determined by the Committee of Ministers.
5. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article have been added in accordance with Article 3




For the consideration of each case brought before it the
Court shall consist of a Chamber composed of seven judges. There
shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber the judge who
is a national of any State party concerned, or, if there is none, a
person of its choice who shall sit in the capacity of judge; the
names of the other judges shall be chosen by lot by the President
before the opening of the case.
Article 44
Only the High Contracting Parties and the Commission
shall have the right to bring a case before the Court.
Article 45
The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases con-
cerning the interpretation and application of the present Conven-
tion which the High Contracting Parties or the Commission shall
refer to it in accordance with Article 48.
Article 46
1. Any of the High Contracting Parties may at any time
declare that it recognises as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement the jurisdiction of the Court in all matters
concerning the interpretation and application of the present Con-
vention.
2. The declarations referred to above may be made uncon-
ditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of seyeral or
certain other High Contracting Parties or for a specified period.
3. These declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe who shall transmit copies
thereof to the High Contracting Parties.
Article 47
The Court may only deal with a case after the Commission
has acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement
and within the period of three months provided for in Article 32.
Article 48
The following may bring a case before the Court, provided
that the High Contracting Party concerned, if there is only one,
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or the High Contracting Parties concerned, if there is more than
one, are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or,
failing that, with the consent of the High Contracting Party con-
cerned, if there is only one, or of the High Contracting Parties
concerned if there is more than one:
(a) the Commission;
(b) a High Contracting Party whose national is alleged to
be a victim;
(c) a High Contracting Party which referred the case to the
Commission;
(d) a High Contracting Party against which the complaint
has been lodged.
Article 49
In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
Article 50
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising
from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the said
Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the conse-
quences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
Article 51
1. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the Court.
2. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to
deliver a separate opinion.
Article 52
The judgment of the Court shall be final.
Article 53
The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the de-
cision of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
Article 54
The judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Com-




The Court shall draw up its own rules and shall determine
its own procedure.
Article 56
1. The first election of the members of the Court shall take
place after the declarations by the High Contracting Parties men-
tioned in Article 46 have reached a total of eight.




On receipt of a request from the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe any High Contracting Party shall furnish an
explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the
effective implementation of any of the provisions of this Conven-
tion.
Article 58
The expenses of the Commission and the Court shall be
borne by the Council of Europe.
Article 59
The members of the Commission and of the Court shall be
entitled, during the discharge of their functions, to the privileges
and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the
Council of Europe and in the agreements made thereunder.
Article 60
Nothing in this Convention shall be constructed as limiting
or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Con-
tracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
Party.
Article 61
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the powers con-
ferred on the Committee of Ministers by the Statute of the Coun-
cil of Europe.
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Article 62
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special
agreement, they will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions
or declarations in force between them for purpose of submitting,
by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or
application of this Convention to a means of settlement other
than those provided for in this Convention.
Article 63
1. Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any
time thereafter declare by notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe that the present Con-
vention shall extend to all or any of the territories for whose
international relations it is responsible.
2. The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories
named in the notification as from the thirtieth day after the re-
ceipt of this notification by the Secretary-General of the Council
of Europe.
3. The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in
such territories with due regard, however, to local requirements.
4. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance
with paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time thereafter de-
clare on behalf of one or more of the territories to which the
declaration relates that it accepts the competence of the Commis-
sion to receive petitions from individuals, non-governmental or-
ganisations or groups of individuals in accordance with Article 25
of the present Convention.
Article 64
1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when
depositing its intrument of ratification, make a reservation in
respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent
that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with
the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be
permitted under this Article.
2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a
brief statement of the law concerned.
Article 65
1. A High Contracting Party may denounce the present
Convention only after the expiry of five years from the date on
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which it became a Party to it and after six months' notice con-
tained in a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe, who shall inform the other High Contracting
Parties.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing
the High Contracting Party concerned from its obligations under
this Convention in respect of any act which, being capable of
constituting a violation of such obligations, may have been per-
formed by it before the date at which the denunciation became
effective.
3. Any High Contracting party which shall cease to be a
Member of the Council of Europe shall cease to be a Party to this
Convention under the same conditions.
4. The Convention may be denounced in accordance with
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs in respect of any terri-
tory to which it has been declared to extend under the terms of
Article 63.
Article 66
1. This Convention shall be open to the signature of the
Members of the Council of Europe. It shall be ratified. Ratifica-
tions shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council
of Europe.
2. The present Convention shall come into force after the
deposit of ten instruments of ratification.
3. As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the
Convention shall come into force at the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification.
4. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall
notify all the Members of the Council of Europe of the entry into
force of the Convention, the names of the High Contracting Par-
ties who have ratified it, and the deposit of all instruments of
ratification which may be affected subsequently.
Done at Rome this 4th day of November 1950 in English and
French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which
shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe.
The Secretary-General shall transmit certified copies to each of
the signatories.
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Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the
Council of Europe,
Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforce-
ment of certain rights and freedoms other than those already
included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on
4th November, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Conven-
tion");
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful en-
joyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his posses-
sions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way im-
pair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties.
Article 2
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exer-
cise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education
and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own
religious and philosophical convictions.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elec-
tions at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions
which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people
in the choice of the legislature.
Article 4
Any High Contracting Party may at the time of signature or
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ratification or at any time thereafter communicate to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe a declaration stating
the extent to which it undertakes that the provisions of the pres-
ent Protocol shall apply to such of the territories for the interna-
tional relations of which it is responsible as are named therein.
Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a
declaration in virtue of the preceding paragraph may from time
to time communicate a further declaration modifying the terms
of any former declaration or terminating the application of the
provisions of this Protocol in respect of any territory.
A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall be
deemed to have been made in accordance with Paragraph (1) of
Article 63 of the Convention.
Article 5
As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions of
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Protocol shall be regarded as addi-
tional Articles to the Convention and all the provisions of the
Convention shall apply accordingly.
Article 6
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the Members of
the Council of Europe, who are the signatories of the Convention;
it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratification of
the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit of ten
instruments of ratification. As regards any signatory ratifying
subsequently, the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of the
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
The instruments of ratificaton shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, who will notify all
Members of the names of those who have ratified.
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Protocol No. 2
To the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,
Conferring Upon the European
Court of Human Rights Competence
To Give Advisory Opinions
The member States of the Council of Europe signatory
hereto,
Having regard to the provisions of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed
at Rome on 4th November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Convention") and, in particular, Article 19 instituting, among
other bodies, a European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
referred to as "the Court");
Considering that it is expedient to confer upon the Court
competence to give advisory opinions subject to certain condi-
tions;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Min-
isters, give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the
interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto.
2. Such opinions shall not deal with any question relating
to the content or scope of the rights or freedoms defined in Section
1 of the Convention and in the Protocols thereto, or with any
other queston which the Commission, the Court or the Commit-
tee of Ministers might have to consider in consequence of any
such proceedings as could be instituted in accordance with the
Convention.
3. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to request an
advisory opinion of the Court shall require a two-thirds majority
vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.
Article 2
The Court shall decide whether a request for an advisory
opinion submitted by the Committee of Ministers is within its




1. For the consideration of requests for an advisory opinion,
the Court shall sit in plenary session.
2. Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions of the Court.
3. If the advisory opinion does not represent in whole or in
part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be
entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
4. Advisory opinions of the Court shall be communicated to
the Committee of Ministers.
Article 4
The powers of the Court under Article 55 of the Convention
shall extend to the drawing up of such rules and the determina-
tion of such procedure as the Court may think necessary for the
purposes of this Protocol.
Article 5
1. This Protocol shall be open to signature by member
States of the Council of Europe, signatories to the Convention,
who may become Parties to it by:
(a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification
or acceptance;
(b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification or
acceptance, followed by ratificaton or acceptance.
Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force as soon as all States
Parties to the Convention shall have become Parties to the Proto-
col, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle.
3. From the date of the entry into force of this Protocol,
Articles 1 to 4 shall be considered an integral part of the Conven-
tion.
4. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall
notify the member States of the Council of:
(a) any signature without reservation in respect of ratifica-
tion or acceptance;
(b) any signature with reservation in respect of ratification
or acceptance;
(c) the deposit of any instrument of ratification or accep-
tance;
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(d) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accor-
dance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
Protocol No. 3
To the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending
Articles 29, 30 and 34 of the
Convention
The member States of the Council of Europe, signatories to
this Protocol,
Considering that it is advisable to amend certain provisions
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th November 1950 (here-
inafter referred to as "the Convention") concerning the procedure
of the European Commission of Human Rights;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. Article 29 of the Convention is deleted.
2. The following provision shall be inserted in the Conven-
tion:
"Article 29
After it has accepted a petition submitted under Article 25,
the Commission may nevertheless decide unanimously to reject
the petition if, in the course of its examination, it finds that the
existence of one of the grounds for non-acceptance provided for
in Article 27 has been established.
In such a case, the decision shall be communicated to the
parties."
Article 2
In Article 30 of the Convention, the word "Sub-Commission"
shall be replaced by the word "Commission".
Article 3
1. At the beginning of Article 34 of the Convention, the
following shall be inserted:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 29 ..
2. At the end of the same Article, the sentence "the Sub-
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Commission shall take its decisions by a majority of its members"
shall be deleted.
Article 4
1. This Protocol shall be open to signature by the member
States of the Council of Europe signatories to the Convention,,
who may become parties to it either by:
(a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification
or acceptance, or
(b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification or
acceptance, followed by ratification or acceptance.
Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force as soon as all States
Parties to the Convention shall have become Parties to the Proto-
col, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle.
3. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall
notify the member States of the Council of:
(a) any signature without reservation in respect of ratifica-
tion or acceptance;
(b) any signature with reservation in respect of ratification
or acceptance;
(c) the deposit of any instrument of ratification or accep-
tance;
(d) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accor-
dance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
Protocol No. 4
To the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Securing
Certain Rights and Freedoms Other
Than Those Already Included in the
Convention And In The First
Protocol Thereto
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the
Council of Europe,
1. The words "signatories to the Convention" did not appear in the original English
text of Article 4. This technical error was corrected by a certificate of correction of the
Secretary-General of 14th April 1967.
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Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforce-
ment of certain rights and freedoms other than those already
included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on
4th November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention")
and in Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention,
signed at Paris on 20th March 1952;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
No one shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the ground
of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
Article 2
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory have the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national se-
curity or public safety, for the maintenance of "ordre public", for
the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject,
in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law
and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.
Article 3
1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individ-
ual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of
which he is a national.
2. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory
of the State of which he is a national.
Article 4




1. Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of signa-
ture or ratification of this Protocol, or at any time thereafter,
communicate to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
a declaration stating the extent to which it undertakes that the
provisions of this Protocol shall apply to such of the territories for
the international relations of which it is responsible as are named
therein.
2. Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a
declaration in virtue of the preceding paragraph may, from time
to time, communicate a further declaration modifying the terms
of any former declaration or terminating the application of the
provisions of this Protocol in respect of any territory.
3. A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall
be deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 63 of the Convention.
4. The territory of any State to which this Protocol applies
by virtue of ratification or acceptance by that State, and each
territory to which this Protocol is applied by virtue of a declara-
tion by that State under this Article, shall be treated as separate
territories for the purpose of the references in Articles 2 and 3 to
the territory of a State.
Article 6
1. As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions
of Articles 1 to 5 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional
Articles to the Convention, and all the provisions of the Conven-
tion shall apply accordingly.
2. Nevertheless, the right of individual recourse recognised
by a declaration made under Article 25 of the Convention, or the
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by a decla-
ration made under Article 46 of the Convention, shall not be
effective in relation to this Protocol unless the High Contracting
Party concerned has made a statement recognising such right, or
accepting such jurisdiction, in respect of all or any of Articles 1
to 4 of the Protocol.
Article 7
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature by the Members
of the Council of Europe who are the signatories of the Conven-
tion; it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratifica-
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tion of the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit
of five instruments of ratification. As regards any signatory ratify-
ing subsequently the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of
the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, who will notify
all Members of the names of those who have ratified.
Protocol No. 5
To The Convention For The
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending Articles
22 and 40 Of The Convention
The Governments signatory hereto, being members of the
Council of Europe,
Considering that certain inconveniences have arisen in the
application of the provisions of Articles 22 and 40 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms signed at Rome on 4th November 1950 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Convention") relating to the length of the terms of
office of the members of the European Commission of Human
Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") and of the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the
Court");
Considering that it is desirable to ensure as far as possible
an election every three years of one half of the members of the
Commission and of one third of the members of the Court;
Considering therefore that it is desirable to amend certain
provisions of the Convention;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
In Article 22 of the Convention, the following two paragraphs
shall be inserted after paragraph (2):
"(3) In order to ensure that, as far as possible, one half of
the membership of the Commission shall be renewed every three
years, the Committee of Ministers may decide, before proceeding
to any subsequent election, that the term or terms of office of one
or more members to be elected shall be for a period other than
six years but not more than nine and not less than three years.
(4) In cases where more than one term of office is involved
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and the Committee of Ministers applies the preceding paragraph,
the allocation of the terms of office shall be effected by the draw-
ing of lots by the Secretary-General, immediately after the elec-
tion."
Article 2
In Article 22 of the Convention, the former paragraphs (3)
and (4) shall become respectively paragraphs (5) and (6).
Article 3
In Article 40 of the Convention, the following two paragraphs
shall be inserted after paragraph (2):
"(3) In order to ensure that, as far as possible, one third of
the membership of the Court shall be renewed every three years,
the Consultative Assembly may decide, before proceeding to any
subsequent election, that the term or terms of office of one or
more members to be elected shall be for a period other than nine
years but not more than twelve and not less than six years.
(4) In cases where more than one term of office is involved
and the Consultative Assembly applies the preceding paragraph,
the allocation of the terms of office shall be effected by the draw-
ing of lots by the Secretary-General immediately after the elec-
tion."
Article 4
In Article 40 of the Convention, the former paragraphs (3)
and (4) shall become respectively paragraphs (5) and (6).
Article 5
1. This Protocol shall be open to signature by Members of
the Council of Europe, signatories to the Convention, who may
become Parties to it by:
(a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification
or acceptance;
(b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification or
acceptance, followed by ratification or acceptance.
Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force as soon as all Con-
tracting Parties to the Convention shall have become Parties to
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the Protocol, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of
this Article.
3. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall
notify the Members of the Council:
(a) any signature without reservation in respect of ratifica-
tion or acceptance;
(b) any signature with reservation in respect of ratification
or acceptance;
(c) the deposit of any instrument of ratification or accep-
tance;
(d) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accor-
dance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
